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Choice is critical for a variety of positive developmental outcomes, including self-
esteem, well-being, and intrinsic motivation. The intuition that our actions are freely 
chosen is also important for our causal reasoning and our moral evaluations of others. 
In this dissertation, I explore the interplay between young children’s concepts of 
choice and their emerging morality. Chapter 1 reviews current theories of moral 
development and sets up ideas for future investigations. Chapter 2 explores three 
related questions: (i) What do children’s early concepts of choice look like?; (ii) Do 
children believe moral and social actions are choices?; and (iii) What are 
developmental and cultural variations in children’s beliefs about moral actions as 
choices? Chapter 3 focuses on how children make the choice between following 
moral/social obligations and following their own desires. Chapter 4 directly 
investigates whether children’s ideas of choice influence their emerging prosocial 
behavior. Finally, Chapter 5 reviews how concepts of choice may be intimately tied to 
young children’s moral cognition and prosocial behavior.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 The ability to understand and anticipate the needs of others, to empathize with 
those in distress, and to behave prosocially, cooperatively, and altruistically – in short, 
to think and to act morally – is indisputably fundamental to the human species. What 
is disputable, however, is how humans come to acquire such “moral” tendencies. This 
question has philosophical origins in as far back as 17th and 18th century (and 
arguably, earlier), and has been answered with a multitude of opinions. Some have 
argued that humans are inherently selfish and moral behavior is attributable to a selfish 
desire to safely cohere in social groups (Hobbes, 1651/1998); on the other end of the 
spectrum, others have argued that society could make better strides in capitalizing on 
the naturally occurring moral qualities in humans such as empathy and cooperation 
(Rousseau, 1755/2013).  
 To date, modern empirical psychology has contributed much to the 
understanding of morality. For example, we now can understand that various types of 
neural circuitry are responsible for processing morally-laden dilemmas (e.g., Decety & 
Howard, 2013; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001), that 
emotions may enhance as well as disrupt (but importantly, shape) moral judgment and 
action (e.g., Hoffman, 2000; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2012; Preston & DeWaal, 2002; 
Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006), and that people rely on a host of emotional and 
cognitive, self-interested and other-interested, rational and non-rational processes 
when making moral judgments (see Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 2008; Haidt, 2001; 
Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; Sunstein, 2005 for important examples). 
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 My interest, however, lies in the acquisition of morality – both in moral 
cognition and prosocial behavior. That is: how do we come to understand what 
“counts” as a moral rule? Where does an understanding of morality come from? What 
causes our commitment to helping, sympathizing with, and cooperating with others? 
The founders of modern moral development reasoned (in my view, correctly) that 
children were critical to answering these questions. For example, Piaget (1932/1997) 
began by surveying children of different ages about various morally-laden scenarios: 
Should Timmy be punished for breaking 10 cups? How about breaking 10 cups by 
accident? In doing so, he charted out stages that children progress through, arguing 
that morality begins with a focus on obedience, on rules, and on punishment. He 
argued that children’s frameworks rarely took into account intent or higher-order 
principles such as justice and fairness. Children, he reasoned, use fundamentally 
different principles than adults when deciding how to dole out praise, punishment, and 
moral judgment.  
 Modern moral development has now moved beyond Piaget, and now finds that 
children have a richer, more sophisticated understanding of moral rules than 
previously thought. Just to list a few examples: three-year-olds distinguish the 
difference between moral rules (e.g., don’t hit) and rules of social convention (don’t 
wear pajamas to class; Smetana, 1984); toddlers and preschoolers punish transgressors 
according to the transgressors’’ intentions, not actions (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010; 
Nelson, 1980); preschoolers sympathize with those who are harmed and not simply 
those who are crybabies (Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2013); elementary school-aged 
children believe that people have a greater moral obligation towards their in-group 
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members (DeJesus, Rhodes, & Kinzler, in press; Rhodes & Chalik, in press); and 
preschoolers believe that resources should be distributed according to effort (Kenward 
& Dahl, 2011; Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012). The summation of this work, 
along with countless other studies that have emerged in the last 5-10 years, suggests 
that children’s social and moral evaluations are incredibly nuanced, that judgments are 
flexible rather than rigidly endorsed, and that children are able to attend to a seemingly 
endless amount of morally-relevant features of situations.  
 And of course, it is worth noting that children are not simply astute moral 
thinkers. Contrary to the intuitive belief that children act selfishly, modern empirical 
work has now extensively documented the helping behaviors of children as young as 
14 months (see Rheingold, 1982; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2012; Warneken, & 
Tomasello, 2006; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, & Wagner, 1992 for key examples). 
We also know other interesting facts about how children behave: elementary school-
aged children are strongly averse to inequitable distribution of resources (Shaw & 
Olson, 2012), toddlers help others even in the absence of parental encouragement 
(Warneken & Tomasello, 2013), toddlers spontaneously console those who have been 
harmed (Vaish, Missana, & Tomasello, 2011), and preschoolers often engage in 
‘paternalistic’ helping (helping that violates the helpee’s immediate desires, but serves 
to accomplish a longer-term goal; e.g., refusing to give a marshmallow to a child who 
wants one but is allergic; Martin & Olson, 2013). 
 Such work has made great advances in elucidating the form and structure of 
early moral cognition and prosocial behavior, and my own dissertation is highly 
influenced by this research. However, my ultimate question concerns not whether 
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children possess early moral competencies, but rather on how such competencies are 
expressed. In asking this question, I will proceed as follows. The rest of this 
introduction will outline several views on moral development. The following three 
chapters will then provide empirical work on three distinct investigations: (1) how 
ideas about choice and morality are expressed across cultures and ages (Chapter 2), (2) 
how early prosociality (rule-abiding behavior) is affected by the cognitive input (adult 
explanations) that children receive (Chapter 3), and (3) how early prosociality 
(sharing) is affected by children’s experience of choice (Chapter 4). Each study aims 
to paint a broader picture of how early experiences construct, develop, and elicit our 
moral cognition and behavior. Finally, I conclude (Chapter 5) by reviewing how each 
study may contribute to our understanding of morality, referencing relevant prior and 
ongoing investigations, and outlining fruitful areas for future research. 
Terms and Distinctions 
 To begin, the definition of morality is controversial, and often times broadly 
defined. For the purposes of this dissertation, morality is defined as rules that we 
believe ought to govern our behavior.  That is, we believe that we ought to be kind to 
our friends, to share with others, to avoid cheating on tests. In contrast, there are also a 
series of rules that happen to govern our behavior. For example, we happen to breathe 
oxygen, digest carbohydrates, and drive cars as a mode of transportation. More 
controversially, we also happen to wear clothing, live in nuclear family structures (at 
least throughout most of the United States), and value education. The question of 
whether any given rule is one that we ought to enforce, or one that we simply happen 
to enforce, is often at the core of moral debates. 
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 A second and related distinction is one between the philosophical question of 
what morality is and the psychological question of what we believe morality to be. 
Findings from developmental psychology cannot speak directly to the philosophical 
question. That is, psychology cannot determine whether there actually is a true unified 
construct of morality or whether morality can ever be divorced from social 
convention. Psychological science can, however, assess people’s beliefs about these 
questions. Similarly, psychology cannot answer whether moral behavior should 
involve emotional processes such as empathy, but psychology can answer whether 
moral acts are emotionally motivated. As such, I never focus on the normative 
question of what we ought to enforce; Instead, I focus on the question of what young 
children might believe about we ought to enforce. For example, in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation, I investigate children’s beliefs about whether moral actions (e.g., being 
nice to a friend) are choices, not whether moral actions are truly choices. 
 A third distinction is that between moral cognition and behavior. The term 
“morality” is used to encompass both moral cognition (judgments of persons, 
situations, and actions) and moral behavior (actions). Lastly, and relatedly, I wish to 
make a distinction between moral behavior and prosocial behavior. Moral behavior, as 
defined in this dissertation, concerns behavior that adheres to moral rules and 
principles. It is questionable, both from a psychological and philosophical perspective, 
whether any given human behavior can truly count as a “moral” one. For example, 
philosophers have debated whether moral behavior necessitates either the presence or 
absence of emotional (vs. rational) processes, and psychologists and economists have 
argued whether altruism, by definition, must be inherently selfish in nature. 
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 The term “prosocial behavior”, as used by cognitive developmentalists, is 
divorced from these debates. Prosocial behavior is defined as behavior that happens to 
– but is not necessarily designed to – benefit another person.1 As stated earlier, 
psychology cannot speak directly to the normative question of what morality is; by 
extension, it therefore cannot speak directly to whether children’s actions are truly 
moral. Psychology can, however, determine whether children perform actions that 
benefit others. The focus of this dissertation is therefore almost exclusively on 
prosocial behavior. Chapter 3 of this dissertation focuses on children’s rule-abiding 
behavior, while Chapter 4 focuses on sharing and altruism. 
 To return to the original question of where morality (and prosociality) comes 
from, I begin by reviewing several prominent views of moral development: 
Nativism 
 Perhaps one of the most influential papers in moral cognition research in the 
last decade is Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom’s (2008) study, which found that even 6-
month-old infants prefer prosocial to antisocial characters. In this study, infants 
viewed two videos, each involving two characters: in one video, a “helper” character 
helped another character achieve its goal of climbing up a hill. In a second video, a 
“hinderer” character prevented another from achieving its goal. When infants were 
later presented with the helper and hinderer characters, an overwhelming majority of 
                                                
1 It is worth noting that according to Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad (2007), prosocial behavior is defined 
as voluntary behavior intended to benefit another person. However, the term prosocial behavior has 
been used by various researchers to refer to the helping, sharing, and cooperative behaviors of very 
young (toddler-aged) children (see Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 2009; Warneken & Tomasello, 2009 
for examples). Because the populations of children studied by such researchers tend to be quite young 
(14 months), it is often unclear whether the actions of these children are (a) intentional, or (b) 
knowingly performed with the motivation of benefiting another. As such, I use prosocial to refer to acts 
that happen to benefit others, with or without the motivation or intention to. See also Batson (2003) for 
a discussion of this issue. 
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children chose to play with the helper shape over the hinderer shape. Such 
experiments have now been widely replicated (see Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & 
Mahajan, 2011) using different actors (e.g., animals instead of shapes), different 
actions and goals (e.g., retrieving a ball instead of climbing a hill), and different 
control groups (e.g., controlling for children’s desire to see goal completion). 
 The most notable characteristic of such research is of course the infants’ young 
age: 6 months (see also Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2010 for a replication with 3-
month-old infants). These data are provocative precisely because they show that moral 
judgment appears prior to many experiences that have long been believed to be critical 
to developing moral judgment. That is, because moral judgment appears in 6-month-
olds who have not yet experienced formal schooling, language, peer socialization, 
parental modeling of behavior, or even formal discipline, we may draw the inference 
that such factors are not necessary to elicit moral judgment in young children. Such 
research of course leaves open the possibility that other critical experiences, which do 
occur in the first 6 months, are necessary to elicit moral judgment. However, because 
such research does not find a concrete causal factor, nor posit a likely one, the 
underlying presumption of consumers of this research is that moral judgment is hard-
wired.  
 To supplement this view, the extensive documentation of the helping behavior 
of young children (see Warneken & Tomasello, 2009 for an overview) suggests that 
prosocial behavior also appears prior to explicit socialization and at only 14 months. 
Once again, the underlying presumptions are that prosocial behavior unfolds 
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“naturally” – that is, independent of special cultural factors such as formal schooling – 
and that prosocial behavior appears in the course of typical development. 
Evolution 
 A related view deserving attention is one concerning that of evolution. 
Evolution, unlike much of moral psychology, is concerned with ultimate causes – that 
is, what humans have evolved to do in order to increase their evolutionary fitness. 
Evolutionary models argue that behaviors such as altruism, empathy, or prosociality 
are prominent precisely because they were adaptive to the survival of the human 
species, and therefore evolved over evolutionary time (see Axelrod, 1984; De Waal, 
2008; Hamilton, 1964; Nowak, 2006; and Trivers, 1971 for reviews and examples). In 
support of the evolutionary view, a few distinct studies have now discovered that our 
genetic ancestors (monkeys) also help others achieve their goals (though not at the 
same rates, or as spontaneously as humans do), share food, and are, at least in some 
contexts, sensitive to the well-being of their conspecifics (see Clutton-Brock, 2009 for 
a review). For example, Lakshminarayan and Santos (2008) found that capuchin 
monkeys, when faced with a choice to pull a lever that will deliver a treat to another 
monkey (or a lever that will not), reliably make the choice to be generous and deliver 
the treat. The prominence of such behaviors is debated (e.g., see Skerry, Sheskin, & 
Santos, 2011). However, if we presume that at least some forms of prosociality appear 
in monkeys, then the data lend support to the nativist view by showing that prosocial 
behavior appears independent of structures specific to human societies, such as formal 
schooling, culture, and language. 
Social Learning 
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 A concurrent view of moral development is that neither moral cognition nor 
prosocial behavior is present at birth; rather, both are transmitted through formal 
cultural practices such as schooling, peer relationships, and parent-child attachment 
bonds. Prosociality, it is argued, is therefore pedagogically transmitted from adult to 
child both formally and informally (for an overview of many of these views, see 
Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2007). Research from this tradition covers a rather wide 
variety of views about the innate specificity of moral beliefs, and I will characterize 
them very broadly. To give a classic example, Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1961) 
discovered that children behaved more aggressively towards a toy doll after watching 
an adult model demonstrate that behavior. These researchers posit that children are 
strong imitators of adult behavior, and abstract appropriate methods of behaving 
towards others by mimicking those around them. In a similar demonstration, a more 
recent experiment by Williamson, Donohue, and Tully (2012) found that 2-year-old 
children were more likely to help another person in distress after watching an adult 
experimenter do so. These findings often suggest that a domain-general social learning 
mechanism (e.g., imitation) allows for the transmission of a wide array of possible 
content to be transmitted (e.g., prosocial behavior).  
 Social learning theories often imply that because culture accounts for the 
expression of moral cognition and prosocial behavior, both cognition and behavior 
should be highly variable across cultures. A notable example is Schweder, Mahapatra, 
& Miller (1987), who showed that (a) children rarely, if ever, articulated moral rules 
that were different than those articulated by the adults in their cultures, and (b) even 
the cognitive distinction between moral actions and social-conventional actions, which 
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was argued to be a cultural universal, was culturally determined, rather than 
universally acknowledged (see also Turiel, 1983 for a contrasting view). Importantly, 
such accounts may posit either low-level (e.g., imitation), or high-level (e.g., parent-
child socialization practices; e.g., Brody & Shaffer, 1992; Hoffman, 1970; Houck & 
Lecumeyer-Maus, 2004; McGrath, Wilson, & Frasetto, 1995) transmission practices; 
moreover, the transmission process itself may be either innate or socially learned.  
Emotion and Physiology 
 Many researchers, social learning theorists included, believe that such 
transmission practices, which are extrinsic to the child, may elicit moral cognition and 
prosocial behavior when coupled with internal child-specific mechanisms (e.g., 
temperament, emotion). A prominent example is Kochanska (1997), who proposed an 
interaction between child traits and parenting practices. Her research showed that the 
type of parental practices that is most effective for eliciting prosocial behavior is 
determined by the child’s own characteristics (e.g., temperament). For example, 
children who are fearful are most likely to display moral conscience when raised by 
parents who display gentle parenting practices (e.g., lack of shaming). Other 
researchers suggest that emotions such as sympathy, empathy, and affective 
perspective-taking (see Hoffman, 2000) drive prosocial behavior, but that parenting 
practices help elicit such empathic concern. 
 Notably, some research finds support that internal child qualities such as 
empathy and sympathy may occur independently of socialization practices. For 
example, Dondi, Simion, and Caltran (1999) found that even newborns vocalize 
distress in response to another child’s distress; Similarly, Hepach, Vaish, and 
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Tomasello (2012) found that 2-year-old children show empathic concern absent of 
social rewards. By itself, these data support a nativist view in showing that empathy 
occurs prior to, or in the absence of, extensive socialization. Alternatively these data 
may instead suggest that empathy causes prosocial responding only when combined 
with other (usually domain-general and non-innate) mechanisms (e.g., parenting 
practices). 
Cognitive Development 
 Finally, other traditions focus on the child as an active cognitive interpreter of 
morally-relevant information. These theories share commonalities with social learning 
theories; in particular, such theories posit mechanisms such as cultural transmission or 
parenting practices that account for the moral cognition and prosocial behavior of 
young children. However, these views also suggest that children’s ability to interpret 
and make sense of this information is dependent on other requisite cognitive abilities. 
Piaget (1932/1997) himself was of this tradition. Piaget proposed that children’s 
theories take different forms at different ages/stages of development; progression 
through the stages then depends on factors intrinsic to the child, such as the 
development of abstract operational thinking. 
 Work from this tradition might posit child-specific, cognitive mechanisms that 
elicit either moral cognition or prosocial behavior. For example, Zelazo, Helwig, and 
Lau (1996) found that working memory, or the ability to hold in mind two rules at 
once, predicted children’s abilities to take into account both intention (e.g., Did 
Timmy hit his friend by accident?) and outcome (e.g., Did Timmy’s friend get hurt?) 
when making moral judgments. In another example, Lane, Wellman, Olson, 
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LaBounty, and Kerr (2010) found that theory-of-mind (understanding of others’ 
beliefs and mental states) and emotion understanding (understanding of others’ 
emotions) relate to children’s ability to engage in sophisticated moral judgment. 
Synthesis 
 The studies in this dissertation are from the cognitive development and social 
learning perspective. However, it is important to note that the ideas reviewed are not 
extensive, and other ideas about moral acquisition exist. For example, there are data 
that show the neurological underpinnings to moral cognition and prosocial behavior, 
data that show the heritability of prosociality, theories that posit that moral judgment 
is built from low-level mechanisms such as association (Scarf, Imuta, Colombo, & 
Hayne, 2012), and theories that focus solely on the content of early moral cognition 
while staying agnostic about how content is transmitted.  
 Further, the views discussed are not mutually exclusive. For example, one may 
posit that we have evolved to behave prosocially, but that more proximate mechanisms 
such as empathy and emotional states account for the expression of prosociality in 
present-day humans. One may posit a nativist view for certain forms of moral 
judgment, and a cognitive developmental view for advanced forms of moral reasoning. 
Theories may also be combined: children may rely on a mix of emotional, 
physiological, and cognitive factors, which work together to elicit moral judgment and 
behavior. 
 There is also an expanse of recent developmental work focusing on situational 
factors that drive prosocial behavior. For example, children are more likely to act 
prosocially when they are being watched by others (Engelmann, Herman, & 
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Tomasello, 2013), when they are primed with group membership (Over & Carpenter, 
2009), when the recipient is a friend or in-group member (Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 
2009), after collaborating with a peer (Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2012), 
and after experiencing a natural disaster (Li, Li, Decety, & Lee, 2013). Such work 
often focuses on children’s underlying motivations for behaving prosocially. For 
example, data that focus on children’s increased prosocial behavior in the presence of 
in-group members may imply that social group affiliation is a “naturally occurring” 
phenomenon that then promotes prosocial behavior.  
New Directions and Views 
 In spite of doing much to advance our understanding of moral development, 
important questions remain. First, as noted earlier, there is now an explosion of work 
suggesting that children’s social and moral evaluations are incredibly nuanced. The 
synthesis of this work suggests that children attend to a rather vast amount of 
information – ranging from act-based information (e.g., outcome); actor-based 
information (e.g., intent, group membership, status, and character traits); victim-based 
information (e.g., group membership and character traits); and social-norm 
information. 
 One critical question that arises from this work is how children might make 
sense of and interpret the multitude of moral information that is available to them. 
That is, how do children parse moral situations into relevant and irrelevant 
information? Imagine a child faced with a scenario about Timmy, who accidentally 
broke three of his mother’s favorite teacups. The child is faced with the difficult task 
of deciding which features of the situation are relevant – some of which we, as adults, 
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would all agree are relevant (e.g., the fact that he broke the teacups, the fact that his 
action was accidental), and some of which we would not (e.g., the fact that the teacups 
were blue). Which cognitive mechanisms support the ability to extract the relevant 
meaning of these moral situations? Which frameworks do children use to interpret 
moral information, and how do those frameworks change over time? 
 A second important question is whether moral cognition is connected with 
prosocial behavior, and what the nature of such a connection might be. Recent work 
has begun documenting the various motivational processes that might underlie 
prosocial behavior, including social group affiliation (e.g., Over & Carpenter, 2009), 
concern for others (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2012; 
Zaki & Mitchell, 2013), and the desire to build a reputation (Engelmann, Hermann, & 
Tomasello, 2013; Shaw, 2013). Given the varied nature of prosocial behaviors that 
young children display, several researchers have now theorized that different prosocial 
behaviors may be predicted by different motivations (for an overview, see Paulus, in 
press).  
 Once again, the synthesis of this work appears to be that children pay attention 
to a rather vast amount of information in choosing when and towards whom to be 
prosocial, including information about the outcome (e.g., How much harm was 
done?), the victim (e.g., Is s/he upset justifiably? Is s/he part of my social group?), the 
relevant social norms (e.g., Are others helping? Am I expected to help?), and the 
consequences (e.g., Is anyone watching me?). How do children learn to categorize 
situations into ones that do and don’t require their prosocial behavior? The work from 
this dissertation will attempt to speak to this question by proposing that children’s 
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ideas about choice are critically tied to their understanding of morality and their 
prosocial behavior.  
 In this dissertation, “choice” is defined as any action that (a) is intentional, and 
(b) had alternative possibilities (i.e., could have been otherwise). The first part (a) is 
simple to define: For example, walking down the stairs is usually considered an 
intentional human action, whereas falling down is not. The second part (b), however, 
is more difficult. Imagine you work on the 5th floor of your building and take the stairs 
every day. One might argue that your intentional action of taking the stairs in order to 
get to work on time is necessary (i.e., must occur) and is therefore not a choice. If, 
however, your building also has an elevator, your action of taking the stairs is not 
necessary and may be considered a choice. That is, the non-occurred, but possible 
action, of taking the elevator is an alternative possibility to the occurred action of 
taking the stairs.  
 Notions of choice, as you will read in the following chapters, are highly critical 
to our moral evaluations of others (e.g., Pizarro & Helzer, 2010). For example, our 
legal system relies on the intuition that criminals are punished because they chose to 
perform harmful acts. Similarly, we hold the intuition that perpetrators who had no 
alternative possibilities (i.e., had no choice, as in the case of self-defense) should not 
be punished. For children, choice is critical for a variety of positive developmental 
outcomes including self-esteem, intrinsic motivation, and well being (Ryan, & Deci, 
2000). 
 This dissertation focuses on whether choice might be critical to young 
children’s moral thinking and prosocial behavior. I investigate (a) which human 
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actions children consider to be choices (Chapter 2), (b) how children make the choice 
between following personal desires and following rules (Chapter 3), and (c) how the 
experience of choice is tied to children’s prosocial behavior (Chapter 4). I conclude by 
reviewing future directions and possible areas of investigation.
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CHAPTER 2 
 
NEPALESE AND AMERICAN CHILDREN’S CONCEPTS OF FREEDOM OF 
CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONSTRAINT 
Introduction 
 Our folk psychology depends on the ability to reason about freedom of choice. 
The universal belief that we are “free” to act on our desires and, therefore, to “choose” 
our intended course of action, is fundamental to our everyday social cognition (Baer, 
Kaufman, & Baumeister, 2008).  At the same time, the belief that actions may be 
“unfree,” or constrained by the physical, mental, and social world, similarly informs 
our understanding of agency, causal attribution, and moral responsibility (Nichols & 
Knobe, 2007; Pizarro & Helzer, 2010; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). To what extent are 
these important cognitions universal, and to what extent are they transmitted through 
culture, and learned over developmental time? To investigate this question, my 
collaborators and I interviewed children of a broad range of ages (4-11) in two 
cultures (Nepal and the United States) about their intuitions regarding freedom of 
choice and situational constraint. 
Recent work in developmental psychology has documented that young 
children have some basic understanding of freedom of choice. For example, young 
children understand that their own actions, and those of other agents, are freely willed 
(Chernyak & Kushnir, in press; Kushnir, Wellman, & Chernyak, 2009; Nichols, 
2004). That is, children affirm that, all else being equal, both their own actions and the 
actions of others “could have been otherwise.” 
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 A second and related cognition is that of situational constraint. To adults, “free 
will can’t really mean that at any point a person’s behavior is totally unpredictable 
(and therefore entirely unconstrained)” (p. 4, Baer et al., 2008). Past literature points 
to two constraints that children understand as early as the preschool period. First, 
infants have some notion of how the physical world may constrain the actions of 
agents.  For example, infants infer that people’s paths are constrained by the laws of 
physics (i.e., one cannot pass through a solid brick wall; Gergerly & Csibra, 2003). 
Second, infants and preschoolers understand how mental states (i.e., knowledge) may 
influence one’s decisions, actions, and beliefs (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Wellman, 
1990). Supporting the notion that preschoolers believe that the physical and mental 
world restricts one’s freedom of choice, Schult and Wellman (1997) found that 
children judge certain acts to be physically or biologically impossible, and therefore 
constrained (see also Kalish, 1998). Similarly, Chernyak, Kushnir, and Wellman 
(2010) and Kushnir et al. (2009) found that preschool-aged children judge their own 
actions as determined by physical laws and knowledge states. 
 The presence of such understandings so early in development raises the 
possibility that they are highly intuitive, and therefore universal. Indeed, with respect 
to constraints, Liu, Wellman, Tardif, and Sabbagh (2008) find that ideas about mental 
(i.e., knowledge) constraints are seen across cultures and develop during the preschool 
years. Similarly, a recent study examining adult intuitions across cultures found that 
belief in free will is not culture-dependent (Sarkissian, Chatterjee, De Brigard, Knobe, 
Nichols, & Sirker, 2010). Other work finds that young children value personal choice 
equally across cultures (Helwig, 2006; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Even adults from 
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collectivist, interdependent cultures – in which duty, responsibility, and role 
obligations (rather than freedoms) are highly stressed – feel that those duties are freely 
followed (Miller, 2003; Miller, Das, & Chakravarty, 2011; Savani, Markus, Naidu, 
Kumar, & Berlia, 2010, Exp 5) and endogenously motivated (Miller & Bersoff, 1994).  
On the other hand, adults across cultures differ in the extent to which they consider 
certain social acts “obligations” vs. matters of personal choice. For example, Miller 
and colleagues (Miller & Bersoff, 1998; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990) found that 
Americans were less likely than Hindu Indians to judge that there was a moral 
imperative to help strangers, unliked others, or those only in minor need of help. 
Eastern cultures also, in general, view the self – and therefore, by extension, self-
caused acts – as more “interdependent” (fitting into a larger social context) than 
Western cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Taken together, this work suggests that 
while basic notions of choice and constraint may be similarly endorsed across cultures, 
the recognition of social obligations as constraints on action is susceptible to cultural 
variability. 
 How and when these cultural differences emerge in development remains an 
intriguing empirical question. It is possible, for example, that young children in both 
Eastern and Western cultures begin with the sense that social obligations constrain 
action. Evidence for this idea comes from past work, which found no differences 
between British and Nepalese preschool-aged children’s endorsements of social 
obligations (Harris, Nunez, & Brett, 2001), and even children in Western, 
individualistic societies understand that moral and social rules coerce one’s ability to 
act (Chernyak & Kushnir, in press; Kalish & Shiverik, 2004). Therefore, preschool-
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aged children in both cultures are likely to begin with a strong notion of social 
constraint. However, social constraints should be viewed as ontologically distinct from 
physical ones, and as such, should be more susceptible to cultural change and 
variability. Therefore, as children develop within their respective cultures, their beliefs 
about social constraints should diverge along cultural lines: past developmental 
research has shown that the preschool to the early school-age years are associated with 
the emergence of many cultural differences in social cognition (Miller, 1984; Wang, 
2004).  
 In the current study, I investigated beliefs about freedom of choice, physical 
and mental constraints, and social constraints in two cultural contexts: the United 
States and Nepal.  Nepal was chosen as a representative Eastern culture that has been 
relatively understudied in prior cross-cultural work. It is comprised of collectivist 
subcultures and ethnic groups, all of which stress a strong sense of social 
interdependence (Cole, Walker, & Lama-Tamang, 2006).  A broad age range (4-11) 
was chosen to investigate developmental trends in cultural differences. 
 I devised a questionnaire in which children were asked about their beliefs in 
freedom of choice and constraint. Children heard a series of vignettes, each about a 
character who displays a consistent behavior over time (e.g., always using a pen to 
draw a picture), but has a desire to engage in a new action (e.g., wants to use a pencil).   
Children were then asked two questions about the desired action: whether the 
character could choose to act (Free Choice Judgment) and whether the character is 
going to act (Action Prediction). Each of the items fell into the three categories: (1) 
simple, unconstrained actions (e.g., using a pencil instead of pen); (2) impossible 
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(physically and mentally constrained) actions (e.g., floating in the air instead of falling 
after a jump, doing something you don’t know how to do); and (3) socially constrained 
actions (e.g., causing harm to another, breaking rules). I included a broad range of 
social constraints from moral acts to social and artifact conventions, thus capturing the 
range of social, moral, and obligatory understandings that are present as early as the 
preschool years (Killen & Smetana, 2002; Smetana, 1981; Turiel, 1983). 
The main hypotheses were as follows: 
1) Children across cultures and ages should universally state that simple, 
unconstrained actions are freely chosen, whereas impossible actions are not. 
2) Children across cultures and ages should universally state that people act 
on their desires, but not when those desires are impossible. 
3) As American children age, they should show an increased tendency to state 
that characters can act and will act on desires which break social obligations.2 
It was unclear whether Nepalese children would show the same tendency. 
Method 
Participants 
 Forty-five Nepalese (21 female, 23 male, 1 gender not recorded) children aged 
4-11 (M = 8.22; SD = 1.85) participated. Participants from Nepal were recruited via 
local schools from an urban area (in Kathmandu) and rural villages (in the Annapurna 
Himalaya). A comparison sample of 31 American children (17 female, 14 male) aged 
4-11 (M = 7.23; SD = 1.73) was recruited from two locations in the Northeast U.S: a 
                                                
2 This hypothesis is derived from prior work (Chernyak, Kushnir, & Wellman 2010), which found that 
the youngest American children did not endorse morally-obligated acts as being freely chosen. At the 
same time, however, American adults endorse the idea that moral obligations are choices (Miller, 
1984). 
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small university town, and a mid-sized city. American children were of predominantly 
European-American background, ranging from lower-middle to upper-middle class. 
Ten additional preschool-aged children (9 from Nepal: Mean age = 6.67; 1 from the 
US: age = 4) participated, but were excluded for indiscriminate responding (these 
children answered all “yes” or all “no” to the entire set of Free Choice Judgment 
Questions); I reasoned that such responding indicated either lack of attention or 
understanding of task instructions. 
Procedure 
 A native speaker of their language interviewed all children in a quiet corner or 
separate room. The questionnaire was first devised in English, and then translated into 
Nepali by the third author. The translation was then independently verified by two 
local Nepalis for grammatical errors and cultural acceptability. Small changes to 
ensure cultural acceptability were made (e.g., changing the word “fork” to “hand”; 
using traditional Nepalese names for characters) for select items. For the full set of 
items administered to both the American and Nepalese participants, please see 
Appendix A and B, respectively. The questionnaire was then back-translated by an 
interpreter blind to the original English wording. Both versions were nearly identical. 
Questionnaire 
 The full questionnaire consisted of 27 child-appropriate items in the following 
general format: 
“Peter draws a picture every day. He always uses a pen to make his picture. 
But today, he wants to do something different. Peter wants to make his 
picture with pencils.” 
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 The complete set of 27 items fell into 9 categories (3 items per category). See 
Table 2.1 for examples. In the first category of items, the target actions were simple, 
unconstrained actions; that is, the actions were physically possible and did not violate 
any known laws, norms, or rules (Free Choice items).  The next two sets of items 
comprised impossible actions. That is, the target action was impossible because it 
violated either a Physical Law (e.g., gravity) or a Mental Constraint (e.g., knowledge). 
The next six categories comprised socially constrained items. For these, three items 
were included in which the target action violated a known convention: Social Norms 
(e.g., gender-appropriate dress), Artifact Conventions (e.g., common use), and Moral 
Norms (e.g., avoiding harm to another). I also included actions that violated rules 
(either arbitrary or justified by an appropriate explanation – i.e., Arbitrary and 
Justified Rules items, respectively). Finally, I included actions in which a character 
wants to perform an action that does not violate any conventions but comprises a 
selfish act. Pilot work showed that the full 27-item questionnaire was too exhausting 
for young children. Three 9-item questionnaire subsets were therefore created, each of 
which included one question from each category. Each child was then randomly 
assigned children to receive one of the subsets. Two orderings of the 9 items (forwards 
and backwards) were counterbalanced across participants.3 
 
 
 
                                                
3 A small set of the oldest children were able to complete more than one subset. 
For these children, only their first responses were analyzed. 
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Table 2.1 Sample Questionnaire Items by Category 
Category Example 
Free Choice 
 
 
 
 
Physical Laws 
 “Peter draws a picture every day. He always uses a pen to make 
his picture. But today, he wants to do something different. Peter 
wants to make his picture with pencils.” 
 
“Bobby walks to the store every day. He always walks around the 
big brick wall. But today, he wants to do something different. 
Bobby wants to walk right through the big brick wall.” 
 
Mental Constraints 
“Andrew draws pictures every day. He always draws a picture of a 
dog. But today, Andrew wants to do something different. Andrew 
wants to draw a monkey. But Andrew has never seen a monkey 
before. He doesn’t know what a monkey looks like.” 
 
Social Norms 
 
 
 
Artifact Conventions 
 
 
 
Moral Norms 
 
 
 
Arbitrary Rules 
 
 
 
 
Justified Rules 
 
 
 
 
Selfish Act 
“Gary puts on his clothes every day before he goes outside. He 
always puts on a shirt and pants. But today, Gary wants to do 
something different. Gary wants to wear his sister’s dress today.” 
 
“It is raining in Ben’s town today. He always uses an umbrella 
when it rains. But today, Ben wants to do something different. Ben 
wants to use a bucket when it rains.” 
 
“Pat sees his friend every day. He always tells his friend something 
nice. But today, Pat wants to do something different. Pat wants to 
say something that will make his friend cry.” 
 
“Dina’s mom tells her that she has to sit on the green chair during 
dinner. She always listens to her mom and sits on the green chair. 
But today, Dina wants to do something different. Dina wants to sit 
on the red chair.” 
 
“Polly’s parents tell her not to lift her little sister because she’s too 
heavy for Polly and Polly might get hurt. Polly always listens to her 
parents and doesn’t lift her little sister. But today, Polly wants to do 
something different. Polly wants to lift her little sister.” 
 
“Timmy eats lunch with his friends. He always helps his friends 
clean the table after they are done eating. But today, Timmy wants 
to do something different. Timmy wants to go play outside and not 
help his friends clean the table.” 
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Dependent Measures 
 After hearing each item, participants were asked to answer two questions 
related to the character’s desired action: (1) a Free Choice Judgment regarding 
whether the character can act in line with his/her desire (“Can Peter make his picture 
with pencils today: yes or no?”); and (2) an Action Prediction regarding whether the 
character will act in line with that desire (“What do you think Peter will do today: 
make his picture with a pen or make his picture with pencils?”). 
Results 
 Preliminary analyses showed no effects of gender differences or differences 
between Nepalese participants who were recruited from rural vs. urban areas on any of 
the items. Data were therefore collapsed across these variables. All reported tests are 
two-tailed. 
 The first hypothesis was that children of both cultures would share the 
universal, early-developing intuition of free choice and the complementary notion of 
physical and mental constraint. Thus, no cultural differences were expected in the first 
three categories (Free Choice, Physical Laws, and Mental Constraints). Figure 2.1 
shows responses to the Free Choice Judgment for each of these categories. The 
overwhelming majority of both American (29/30; 97%) and Nepalese (41/45; 91%) 
children answered that people could choose to perform simple unconstrained actions. 
Binomial tests confirmed that the proportion of children in both cultures who 
answered “yes” were significantly above chance, Binomial p’s  < .001. However, the  
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Figure 2.1. Proportion of “Yes” Responses to the Free Choice Judgment and Action 
Prediction Questions for the Free Choice, Physical Laws, and Mental Constraints. 
  
Overwhelming majority of both American and Nepalese children answered that the 
characters could not act against Physical Laws (American: 28/30 (93%), Nepalese: 
34/45 (76%)), or against Mental Constraints (American: 20/30 (67%); Nepalese: 33/45 
(73%)). Binomial tests confirmed that the proportion of “no” responses was 
significantly above chance levels (all Binomial p’s < .01, with the exception of 
American children’s answers to the Mental Constraint questions, where p = .10) There 
were no cultural differences in proportion of “yes” responses in any of the above-
reported categories. For averages of each item separately, by culture and age, see 
Appendices C and D. 
 To investigate whether these intuitions show any developmental or cultural 
variation, I performed three binary regression analyses (one each for Free Choice, 
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Physical Laws, and Mental Constraints). In each regression, I used culture, age, and 
age x culture interaction as predictors and Free Choice Judgment as the response.  
None of these predictors were significant (all p’s > .05).4 Thus, American and 
Nepalese children across all age groups share the intuition that simple actions are free, 
and impossible actions are not, lending support to the idea that the notions of freedom 
of choice and physical and mental constraint are early-developing and culturally 
universal. 
 The next set of analyses focused on the last hypothesis: that cultural exposure 
would shape intuitions regarding what is considered a constraint on one’s action. 
Preliminary analyses of each of the 6 individual social constraint items showed 
consistent results for each item, so data were collapsed across items (alphas ranged 
from .60 to .79). Each child was assigned a score of 0 or 1 (indicating yes or no, 
respectively) for each question. I then averaged Free Choice Judgments for the 
socially constrained items (6 total), so that each child received an average score 
between 0 and 1 representing his or her average Free Choice Judgments in the face of 
social constraints. An average of 0 indicates that the child answered “no” to all of the 
socially-constrained items, and a 1 indicates that the child answered “yes” to all of the 
socially constrained items. One-sampled t-tests revealed that Nepalese participants’ 
Free Choice Judgments were significantly below chance (M =.40, SD = .25), t(44) = -
2.76, p < .01, whereas American participants’ (M = .48, SD = .41) did not differ from 
                                                
4 Additionally, two of overall regression models (Free Choice and Mental Constraints) were not 
significant (p’s > .15). The model using Physical Constraints as the response variable, however, was 
significant, Chi-Square (3, N = 75) = 19.95, p < .001. 
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chance, p > .15. Thus, when considered as a whole, Nepalese children endorsed the 
notion of social constraint, whereas American children did not. 
 To investigate how these changes may emerge with age, I then ran a linear 
regression with culture, age, and age x culture interaction as the predictors, and 
averaged Free Choice Judgment score as the response. The resulting regression lines 
are shown in Figure 2.2. There was a significant effect of culture, B = .93, SE(B) = .31, 
p < .01, age, B = .12, SE(B) = .03, p < .01, and a culture x age interaction, B = -.14, 
SE(B) = .04, p < .01.5 
 
Figure 2.2. Regression Lines for Free Choice Judgment Means (0-1) of the Socially 
Constrained Items (Social Norms, Artifact Conventions, Moral Norms, Arbitrary 
Rules, Justified Rules, and Selfish Acts) vs. Age. 
                                                
5 See Appendices E and F for analyses of regressions done separately for each item. 
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 To investigate this interaction, I ran two follow-up regressions, separately for 
each culture. For the American children, age positively predicted average Free Choice 
Judgment averages, B = .12, SE(B) = .04, p < .01.  However, age was not a significant 
predictor of Free Choice Judgment for Nepalese children (p > .10). The overall results 
thus suggest that while Nepalese children recognized that social obligations pose 
constraints on action across all ages, American children showed a decreased tendency 
to endorse obligations as constraints on actions as they aged. 
 The final analysis concerned hypothesized cultural differences in children’s 
action predictions; that is, I asked whether there are age- and culture-related 
differences in children’s predictions that people will act on desires versus social 
obligations. To make sure there were no wholesale cultural differences in beliefs that 
people act on simple (non-socially constrained) desires, I began with children’s Action 
Prediction responses to the Free Choice, Physical Laws, and Mental Constraint items.  
These are shown in Figure 2.1. The overwhelming majority of both American (28/30; 
93%) and Nepalese children (36/45; 80%) predicted that the characters would act on 
simple desires (Free Choice items). Once again Binomial tests confirmed that 
children’s “yes” responses were significantly above chance levels, p’s < .001. 
Moreover, children of both cultures predicted that the characters would not act on 
impossible desires (Physical Laws: American: 28/30 (93%); Nepalese: 37/45 (82%); 
Mental Constraints: American: 23/30 (77%); Nepalese: 35/45 (78%). Binomial tests 
confirmed that the proportion of “no” responses in each culture was significantly 
above chance, all Binomial p’s < .001. Binary logistic regressions confirmed that these 
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results were not age- or culture-dependent (age, culture, and age x culture interactions 
were not significant predictors for Action Prediction scores, all p’s > .05).6 Thus, 
children across cultures and age groups predicted that the story characters would act 
on unconstrained desires, but would not act on desires that violated physical laws and 
mental constraints. 
 I then investigated developmental and cultural variation in Action Predictions 
for the six socially constrained items. Similar to the Free Choice Judgment analysis, I 
created an average Action Prediction score between 0-1. First, one-sample t-tests 
revealed that both American (M = .35, SD = .36) and Nepalese (M = .27, SD = .21) 
participants’ Action Prediction averages were significantly below chance (American: 
t(31) = -2.40, p < .05; Nepalese: t(44) = -7.37, p < .001). Thus, when considered a 
whole, children in both cultures predicted that people would act on social obligation. 
 To investigate age-related cultural changes, I ran a linear regression with 
culture, age, and age x culture interaction as the predictors and the average Action 
Prediction score as the response. The resulting regression lines are shown in Figure 
2.3. There was a marginally significant effect of culture, B = .47, SE(B) = .28, p = .09, 
a significant effect of age, B = .09, SE(B) = .03, p < .01, and a significant age x culture 
interaction, B = -.08, SE(B) = .04, p < .05. 
 To investigate the interaction, I ran two follow-up linear regressions, 
separately for each culture. In each regression, I used Action Prediction score as the 
response and age as the predictor. For the Nepalese children, age did not significantly 
                                                
6 The Free Choice binary regression (Chi-squared (3, N = 75), p < .05) as well as the Physical 
Constraint binary regression (Chi-squared (3, N = 75), p < .01) were significant overall; However, the 
binary regression using Mental Constraint Action Prediction as the responses was non-significant (p > 
.15). 
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predict Action Prediction scores, p > .10. However, for the American children, age 
positively predicted Action Prediction scores, B = .09, SE(B) = .03, p = .01. Thus, with 
increasing age, American children were increasingly likely to predict that the 
characters would act on their desires when those desires conflicted with social 
obligations. Nepalese children, across all ages, however, predicted instead that 
characters would act on social obligations. These results thus confirm the idea that 
there is cultural variation in the prediction that people act on preferences that conflict 
with social obligations, and that this cultural variation emerges with age. 
 
Figure 2.3. Regression Lines for the Action Prediction Means (0-1) of the Socially 
Constrained Items (Social Norms, Artifact Conventions, Moral Norms, Arbitrary 
Rules, Justified Rules, and Selfish Acts) vs. Age. 
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Discussion 
 The results reveal universal, early-developing intuitions about choice and 
constraint, as well as important developmental and cultural differences. Across ages, 
children in both the United States and Nepal endorsed the freedom of choice to 
perform simple acts (such as drinking milk instead of juice), but recognized that acts 
that violate physical and mental laws (gravity, object solidity, knowledge limitations) 
are constrained.  This suggests that basic intuitions about freedom of choice and 
constraint are culturally universal and emerge early. 
 Importantly, this study also finds evidence for cultural differences and cultural 
learning in children’s concepts of social constraint. With increasing age, American 
children were increasingly less likely to recognize social constraints as imposing on 
one’s ability to act on basic desires. Nepalese children, on the other hand, continued to 
view social obligations as constraining choice and action across all ages. These data 
suggest that social obligations are particularly susceptible to developmental and 
cultural variation. Interestingly, these results parallel age-related and culture-specific 
changes in other aspects of children’s social cognition, such as causal attribution, self-
concept, moral reasoning, and autobiographical memory (Miller, 1984; Wang, 2004). 
It is also notable that this study observed parallel results for both freedom of choice 
and action prediction. These results support previous work pointing to early-
developing links between children’s understanding of desire and action (see Liu et al., 
2008; Wellman & Miller, 2006). 
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 It is important to note that beliefs in freedom of choice may be distinguished 
from the degree to which choice is valued. Prior work finds that Eastern and Western 
cultures differ in the extent to which they perceive and value choice in everyday 
contexts (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999; Savani et al., 2010). This experiment, however, 
looked at explicit endorsements of whether a given action can be chosen at all, not the 
extent to which one values choice. It remains an important question whether the 
Nepalese and young American children saw social obligations simply as an influence 
on one’s decisions, or whether they viewed socially-constrained actions as completely 
outside the arena of choice . However, prior cross-cultural work has found that adults 
in Eastern cultures endorse the idea that interpersonal actions are freely chosen (Miller 
et al., 2011), suggesting that rather than failing to construe such actions as choices, 
children believe that social constraints influence action. 
 The unwillingness on the part of very young children across both cultures to 
endorse freedom of choice (or action) in the face of moral and social constraints is 
consistent with previous work using a different, first-person, action-based (rather than 
third-person, story-based) method. In this work, preschool-aged children were 
unwilling to endorse their own free will to act against moral rules or social norms 
(Chernyak & Kushnir, in press). These results are also consistent with evidence that 
children have empathetic, altruistic, cooperative, and normative tendencies early in life 
(Hoffman, 2000; Killen & Smetana, 2002; Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008; 
Warneken & Tomasello, 2008; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, & Chapman, 1992). 
Taken together, it appears that just as the intuition that we are free to act on desires is 
intuitive, the intuition that people as constrained by social obligation is also highly 
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intuitive; both intuitions are thus seen in children at young ages and across cultures.  
As children age, however, culture and worldview may increasingly serve as guides for 
moral and social cognition: Western children begin to conceptualize moral and social 
actions as unique, character-based choices, while Eastern children focus on the benefit 
to the greater social group (see Miller, 1994). The shift in responses with age (and the 
subsequent divergence of beliefs across cultures) may represent children’s emerging 
ability to engage in deliberative moral reasoning appropriate to their cultural context. 
 The cross-cultural differences found also lead to important questions about the 
specific mechanism through which such differences emerge. Several (non-mutually 
exclusive) explanations are possible. First, conceptual beliefs in choice and social 
constraint may be related to how the Nepali and English languages encode ideas about 
permission and obligation. For example, the English word “can” may denote either 
ability (“Can you reach that far?”) or permission (“Can (May) I have dessert after 
dinner?”). However, in Nepali, different meanings for “can” are consistently denoted 
with different words (akin to the less-frequently used distinction in English between 
“can I” and “may I”). It is possible that such intermixing in English language either 
leads to, or is reflective of, beliefs that actions that are physically possible are also 
permissible.  
 Another explanation concerns differing exposure to rules and standards 
through one’s schooling and home environment. One salient difference between the 
two cultures may be in the way children spend their structured time.  Many of the 
Nepalese participants lived in communities in which farming, cooking, and fetching 
water are ordinary family obligations starting from a young age. Structured time, in 
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addition to school, is thus spent performing actions that benefit larger social units 
(families and communities). These lifestyles may be contrasted to the children in the 
American sample, whose structured time is primarily spent in preschool and 
elementary schools, which place greater emphasis on individual learning. Although 
most children do experience social pressure to share, be polite, and be kind, the 
American children in the subculture sampled rarely engage in instrumental acts for 
greater societal benefit as part of their daily routine. Culturally varied discussions of 
these experiences also serve to shape children’s sense of self with respect to their 
social groups. For example, American schoolteachers often stress the importance of 
“making good choices” with respect to being good to others, while Nepalese schools 
often stress the importance of “being well disciplined”. 
 Finally, children’s observations of adults following and breaking social 
obligations in favor of personal preferences may exert a similar influence. Future 
research should address variety of experience such as family, educational, and political 
background within each cultural group, and how individual experience relates to 
variation in children’s concepts of freedom of choice.  
 Overall, this cross-cultural developmental approach may be a fruitful area for 
future research. This work adds to the present literature investigating conceptual 
learning across cultures (Liu et al., 2008; Miller, 1984). In further studying how 
concepts in young children differ and don’t differ across cultures, researchers may 
study how cultural context provides evidence for children to learn. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
TWO-YEAR-OLDS INHIBIT EXPLORATION TO AVOID HARMING OTHERS 
Introduction 
 Young children are natural learners and are motivated to explore their 
environments (Bruner, Jolly, & Sylva, 1976). Recent work has shown that such 
exploratory play emerges early (within the first to second year of life), and is adaptively 
linked to young children’s social and causal learning (Baldwin, Markman, & Melartin, 
2008; Cook, Goodman, & Schulz, 2011; Schulz, 2012; Schulz & Bonawitz, 2008). 
However, at the same time that exploration emerges, so does an increased awareness of 
rules and social norms, restricting the range of possible exploratory behaviors. To this 
end, young children begin to develop the self-control to follow rules even in the absence 
of external monitors (e.g., adults watching; see Bernier, Carlson, & Whipple, 2010; 
Kochanska, Coy, & Murray, 2001; Kochanska & Knaack, 2004; Kopp, 1982; Zelazo, 
2004), which is also adaptively linked to social and cognitive understanding (see Carlson 
& Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2001). Thus, both exploring the environment 
and internalizing rules are critical cognitive achievements in the early years. 
 These two important abilities are often at odds with one another. In non-
laboratory settings, children’s exploratory play comes at the cost of rule-following 
behavior. Consider the case of a child wishing to test whether the stove is truly hot, or 
whether the vase will actually break upon impact with the floor. If children were guided 
solely by their curiosity, they would fail to acquire norms, rules, and other social 
precautions normally transferred through adult-directed prohibitions. At the same time, if 
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children truly never “tested” the prohibitions provided to them by adults, exploration and 
self-guided learning would cease as well. How do children learn to make important trade-
offs between exploratory play and rule-following behavior? In this paper, I investigate 
the possibility that the trade-off between rule-following and exploration is importantly 
influenced by the explanations given for the rules. Specifically, I suggest that adult 
explanations that reference causal consequences towards others will lead to greater 
motivation to exhibit rule-following and self-control (and conversely, less exploratory 
play). 
Children’s Understanding of Explanations 
 In investigating this claim, it is important to note that prior work has extensively 
documented that young children are astute evaluators of adult explanations. For example, 
preschoolers are known to seek adults for explanations to everyday causal events 
(Hickling & Wellman, 2001). However, children do not simply accept any and all adult-
given explanations, but rather seek for adults to provide causal information pertinent to 
the child’s question (Frazier, Gelman, & Wellman, 2009). Children also prefer that adults 
provide sensical and domain-appropriate explanations for prohibitions. For example, 
preschoolers prefer that teachers explain why moral transgressions are wrong with 
references to harm and victim distress, and social-conventional transgressions with 
references to classroom disorder (Killen, Breton, Ferguson, & Handler, 1994). 
 Causal, sensical, and appropriate explanations should therefore be effective in 
successfully guiding young children’s actions. Several lines of indirect evidence support 
this view. First, work on children’s causal learning shows that children explore an object 
less when given an explanation of “how the toy works” by an adult (Bonawitz et al., 
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2011). Children who were given this explanation restricted their exploratory behaviors to 
those previously shown to them by the knowledgeable adult. Children who watched a 
seemingly unknowledgeable or interrupted demonstrator, however, did not simply mimic 
the adult’s behaviors, and as a result, explored the toy more and discovered a greater 
number of its causal functions. Such work points to the potential role of adults’ 
explanations on children’s subsequent action production.  
 A second line of evidence comes from work showing that parents who use 
inductive techniques are more likely to have compliant children (Brody & Shaffer, 1992; 
Houck & Lecumeyer-Maus, 2004). Inductive techniques often focus on explaining the 
causal consequences of children’s potential behaviors. Such studies suggest the intriguing 
possibility of a causal connection between inductive explanations and rule-following 
behaviors. 
Present Study 
 This work seeks to test directly whether two-year-olds’ actions (ability to follow 
rules) are influenced by the adults’ explanations for those rules. In asking this question, I 
capitalize on two relevant cognitions present by the age of two: young children’s 
emerging prosociality and their causal reasoning. I specifically reasoned that explanations 
that appeal to these cognitions would be particularly effective in guiding children’s 
behaviors. 
Harm-Based Causal Explanations 
 First, I reasoned that in choosing to follow rules, children may be particularly 
motivated by explanations that reference causal harm to others. Support for this work 
comes from the idea that starting from an early age, young children are intrinsically 
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motivated to be prosocial. By the second to third year of life, children help others 
complete their goals (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006), share toys (Schmidt & 
Sommerville, 2008; Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 2010), sympathize with those who 
are harmed (Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009) or in distress (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-
Yarrow, & Wagner, 1992), and punish those who harm others (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 
2010; Vaish, Missana, & Tomasello, 2011). Such prosocial tendencies appear with 
limited experience, are intrinsically motivated (Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2012), and 
occur in the absence of adult authorities, explicit rules, or external rewards (Warneken & 
Tomasello, 2008; 2012). Children’s internal prosocial motivations may thus be 
particularly salient and effective in causing children to comply with rules set forth by 
adults. Explanations for prohibitions that reference harm towards others (e.g., “Don’t 
break your sister’s toy because it will make her sad”) may elicit prosocial tendencies in 
children. As a result, these explanations may be effective in causing children to follow 
rules and inhibit their exploratory behavior. 
Non-Harm-Based Causal Explanations 
 Another potential motivator, however, may be adult causal explanations, with or 
without reference to another’s harm. For example, explaining to children that a given 
prohibition (e.g., keeping the front door open) has causal consequences (e.g., letting the 
cold air in) may also be effective in guiding rule-following behavior. By the age of two, 
children are shown to engage in many forms of rudimentary causal reasoning (e.g., 
Gopnik, Sobel, Glymour, & Schulz, 2001) about their physical world, and as such, may 
be receptive to explanations that explain how their rule-breaking behavior may impact 
their physical surroundings. 
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Nonsensical Explanations 
 Such causal explanations may be contrasted with nonsensical, inappropriate, 
noncausal, or simply nonexistent explanatory statements for rules (e.g., “Don’t open the 
door just because”). As referenced previously, by the preschool age, children reject non-
sensical facts and explanations from adults, at least in contexts in which compliance with 
rules is not at issue (Frazier et al., 2009; Killen et al., 1994; Koenig & Harris, 2005). The 
study presented here investigates whether even younger children similarly reject 
nonsensical rules and explanations, especially in the context of exploratory play. 
Moreover, this study investigates which types of sensible explanations are most effective 
in causing younger children’s rule-following behavior.  
 Two-year-old children were introduced to an attractive exploratory play object (a 
toy box) and a prohibition against exploration (a rule that the child was not allowed to 
open the box). I was interested in how explaining the consequences of exploration would 
impact children’s subsequent exploratory play. In particular, I contrasted children’s 
exploration of the toy box in the face of an explanation that referenced a) a consequence 
related to harming another (Harm-Causal Explanation: “If you open the box, the other 
kids will cry”) with b) a causal consequence that was harmful to an object (Mechanical-
Causal Explanation: “If you open the box, the toys will break”), and c) an explanation 
that references a harmful consequence to another, but not one that is causally connected 
to the child’s action (Harm-Content Control Explanation: “If the other kids find out the 
box is orange, they’ll cry”).  
 Two related exploratory behaviors were measured: (1) children’s ability to delay 
exploration (measured via delay time prior to breaking the rule and opening the box), and 
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(2) children’s ability to inhibit exploratory behavior (measured via the amount of time 
spent exploring the toys inside the box once it was opened). 
 Children were introduced to a fun toy box (an exploratory play object), and an 
experimenter informed the child that s/he was not allowed to open it (adult-given 
prohibition). The experimenter then justified the rule with either an explanation related to 
psychological harm to others (Harm-Consequence Explanation: “If the other kids find out 
that you got to open the box, they’ll get really sad! They’ll probably even cry!”), an 
explanation that referenced physical harm towards physical objects (Mechanical-
Consequence Explanation: “The toys inside the box are really easy to break. So if you 
open the box, the toys will break!”), or an explanation that nonsensically referenced 
psychological harm to others (“If the other kinds find out that the box is orange, they’ll 
get really sad!”). The experimenter then left the room for four minutes, leaving the child 
with the toy box. During this time, children’s exploratory behaviors were coded.  Since 
the overall hypothesis was that both causal and prosocial factors influence self-control, I 
hypothesized that children would exhibit less exploratory behavior (exploring the toy 
box) in response to the Harm-Consequence explanation than the Mechanical-
Consequence explanation.  
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty-two 2-year-old children (16 females) participated (M = 25.56 mo., range  = 
21.96-30.36 mo.). Two children were replaced due to protocol error (the child grabbed 
the box and opened it before the experiment began, or the experimenter misworded the 
explanation). Participants were recruited from a small university town. Demographics 
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data were not collected; however, most participants were of primarily of European-
American, middle-class background. Participants were contacted via phone and email, 
which were obtained through hospital records of birth announcements and flyers posted 
at nearby preschools. 
Procedure 
 An experimenter led each participant and his/her parent into a room with a table 
and chairs. In order to limit interaction, each parent was asked to sit directly behind the 
participant in a separate chair to limit interaction (see Figure 3.1). Additionally, prior to 
beginning the experiment, each parent was briefed about the study and asked not to 
instruct his/her child regarding the box. The experimenter placed a piece of paper on one 
side of the participant and a green wooden box (that was decorated with floral foam 
stickers on the outside) on the other. The sides of the box and paper were 
counterbalanced across participants. While doing so, the experimenter explained that she 
had two games she could play (“I have two games for you today – one game that involves 
this special box [experimenter then pointed to the box] and another game involves just 
drawing some shapes [experimenter pointed to a blank piece of paper]”). The 
experimenter then added that the child was not allowed to open the box today and will 
have to draw shapes instead. 
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Figure 3.1. Layout of experimental procedure for (a) Experiment 1 and (b) Experiment 2. 
 
 Critically, each child was then provided one of two explanations for why s/he 
couldn’t open the box, randomly assigned (“The reason why we can’t open the special 
box is…”): Either a Harm-Consequence Explanation (“If the other kids find out you 
got to open the box, the other kids will get really sad! They’ll probably even cry!”), or a 
Mechanical-Consequence Explanation (“The toys inside the box are really easy to 
break. So if you open the box, the toys will break!”). The experimenter then repeated the 
explanation twice to assure that the child understood, stated that she had to leave in order 
to get some markers for them to draw with, and left the room. After four minutes, the 
experimenter returned, and engaged in a brief drawing session with the child. 
Coding 
 Videos were coded using ELAN Coding Software. A hypothesis and condition-
blind coder coded all videos, and a second blind coder coded a subset (25%). Average 
ICC = .96. A separate research assistant transcribed all videos for any parent-child 
dialogue that took place. 
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 Participants’ actions during the four minutes the experimenter left the room were 
coded for two exploratory behaviors: a) delay time (in seconds) prior to opening the box, 
and b) duration of exploratory behavior (also in seconds) defined as time spent touching 
the toys inside the box (when the box was not open). Finally, videos were coded for c) 
the number of times children handed the box to the parent. Coding occurred by viewing 
videotapes frame-by-frame and noting the timestamp (i.e., hitting “Enter”) when each 
instance of a behavior (e.g., touching the toys) occurred and again when the behavior 
ended. 
Results 
 The primary investigation was whether children would display different patterns 
of exploratory behavior after hearing a harm-consequence explanation than a mechanical-
consequence explanation. The descriptive data of number of children who performed 
each behavior are included in Table 3.1. An ordinal regression showed that there were no 
differences in proportion of children who displayed each of the behaviors shown in Table 
3.1. 
 
Table 3.1. Descriptive data for number of children displaying each type of behavior in 
Experiment 1. 
 Opened Box = No; 
Touched Toys = No 
Opened Box = Yes; 
Touched Toys = No 
Opened Box = Yes; 
Touched Toys = 
Yes 
Harm-Consequence 10 2 4 
Mechanical-
Consequence 
8 0 8 
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  To investigate the effect of condition on children’s delay time prior to opening 
the box behavior, I ran a MANCOVA using condition type, gender, age group, and all of 
the interactions as the predictors, and delay time for the two exploratory behaviors (delay 
time prior to opening the box, duration of time touching the box and the toys inside) as 
the response.7 Age and gender were included as predictors because both age and gender 
have been found to be associated with delay of gratification and executive function 
(Kochanska, 2002; Mischel & Ebbesen, 2003; Silverman, 2003). Age group was defined 
via a median split. All reported tests are two-tailed.  
 There was an overall main effect of condition, F(2, 23) = 3.66, p < .05, and a 
main effect of age group, F(2,23) = 4.97, p < .05. Gender, and all of the two-way and 
three-way interaction effects were not significant (all p’s > .05). Therefore, overall, there 
were differences in children’s exploratory behavior across conditions. 
 Follow-up analyses showed that there were no differences in delay time prior to 
opening the box, p > .15. However, children in the harm-consequence condition spent 
longer exploring the box (touching toys inside) than those in the mechanical-consequence 
condition, F(1,24) = 5.69, p < .05. This result is shown in Figure 3.2 below. 
                                                
7 Because children who never opened the box were assigned a score of 240, data were skewed, and 
normality assumptions could not be met. To account for this, I also ran a Kaplan-Meier survival analysis 
using opening the box as the “event”, and delay time prior to opening the box as the time elapsed prior to 
the “event”. There were no significant differences in delay time between conditions for either Experiment 1 
or 2. However, results should be interpreted carefully due to low sample size (N = 16 per condition). 
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Figure 3.2. Estimated marginal means (bars represent standard errors) for duration of  
time spent exploring the toys inside the box across conditions in Experiment 1. 
 
 The results of Experiment 1 thus show that even after controlling for the effects of 
age on executive control and compliance, children who heard harm-consequence 
explanations delayed exploration longer (waited longer to touch the toys inside the box) 
and explored less than those who heard mechanical-consequence explanations. 
Parent-Child Behaviors 
 All except one parent followed the experimenter’s direction, and restricted 
themselves from instructing their children about the toy box. Independent t-tests revealed 
that there were no differences between conditions in number of parent utterances or child 
utterances (all p’s > .05). 
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 Next, I examined whether children approached their parents with the toy box. 
Parents are often socially referenced as authority figures in cases of unclear situations 
(Adolph, Karasik, & Tamis-LeMonda, 2010). In this case, parents would have the ability 
to help their children in the case of the mechanical consequence (by opening the box 
carefully or skillfully), but not in the case of the harm consequence. If children infer that 
they can recruit their parents to help avoid negative consequences, children should 
attempt to use their parents more in the mechanical-consequence than in the harm-
consequence condition. I thus coded for number of times the child brought the box to the 
parent: children in the mechanical-consequence condition brought the box to parents 
more often (M = .38, SD = .72), than those in the harm-consequence condition (in which 
no child ever brought the box to the parent), t(30) = -2.09, p < .05. 
Experiment 2 
 The results of Experiment 1 show that children who heard harm-consequence 
explanations delayed exploration longer than those who heard mechanical-consequence 
explanations. Moreover, children appropriately referenced their parents when parents 
could help, suggesting that children were reasoning causally about the potential 
consequences of their behavior (see also Gweon & Schulz, 2011). In Experiment 2, I 
sought to resolve two further questions.  
 First, I asked whether children delay exploration in response to harm explanations 
that are direct consequences of their rule-breaking in contrast to two alternatives. The 
first alternative explanation suggests that children merely respond to explanations that 
evoke harm associated with the target object. Another alternative possibility is that the 
word “cry” is more salient to children than the word “break”. To investigate these 
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alternative possibilities, I once again introduced children to a toy box and a prohibition 
against opening it, but this time added a control condition in which the prohibition was 
justified with a harm-content explanation (“If the other kids find out the box is orange, 
they’ll cry!”). In this condition, harm was referenced with the target object, but was not a 
consequence of the child’s exploratory behaviors. 
 Second, I inquired whether the results of Experiment 1 were due to children 
inferring that parents would help them avoid the negative consequence of the toy 
breaking.  More generally, I also wanted to ensure that parents would not inadvertently 
interfere in their children’s behavior in either condition (harm-consequence or 
mechanical consequence).  Thus, in Experiment 2, parents were positioned facing away 
from their children, and were given headphones with music so that they were unable to 
see or hear the experimenter’s interaction with the child. This ensured that parents were 
blind to the explanation their child heard and that children were relatively less able to 
engage their parents. 
 Once again, it was predicted that prosocial causal explanations should be more 
effective in inhibiting exploratory play than non-causal explanations (harm-content). 
Without appeals for parental help or general parental interference, it was unclear whether 
other negative causal explanations (the mechanical-consequence condition) would differ 
from the harm-content explanation. However, if children’s motivations are guided by 
their prosocial tendencies and causal understanding, it is likely that non-prosocial 
negative causal explanations (the mechanical-consequence condition) would inhibit 
exploratory play more than non-causal explanation, but less than causal explanations that 
reference prosocial considerations (the harm-consequence condition). 
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Method 
Participants 
 Forty-eight 2-year-old children (27 females) participated (M = 25.32 mo., range  
= 20.28 mo. – 30.24 mo.). Nine children were replaced: 2 due to protocol error (the 
experimenter misread the protocol), and 7 due to parental interference (because the parent 
instructed the child about the toy box). Participant demographics and recruitment 
followed that of Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
 Procedures were identical to Experiment 1 with the following modifications: 
First, parents were asked to sit behind and facing away from their children (see Figure 
3.1); and were asked to put on headphones with music playing. To further minimize the 
possibility of parental interference, parents were also given a set of filler questionnaires 
and asked them to focus on filling them out while their children participated. An orange 
box with dinosaur and star stickers on the outside was positioned in the center of the table 
in front of the child. 
 Children were provided one of three explanations for why they couldn’t open the 
box, randomly assigned: Harm-Consequence Explanation (“If the other kids find out 
you got to open this box, they’ll get really sad! They’re going to cry!”), a Mechanical-
Consequence Explanation (“The toys inside the box are really easy to break. So if you 
open the box, the toys will break!”), or a Harm-Content Control Explanation (“If the 
other kids find out this box is orange, they’ll get really sad! They’re going to cry!”). As in 
Experiment 1, the experimenter repeated the explanation twice, and then stated that she 
had to get paper and a marker. 
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 After four minutes, the experimenter returned, and engaged in a brief drawing 
session with the child. 
Coding 
 Coding procedures followed those of Experiment 1 (Average ICC = .99). Because 
parents were unable to engage in dialogue with their children (they faced away from their 
children and listened to music), parent-child dialogue was not transcribed. Moreover, 
with parents faced away from their children, and in headphones, only one child ever 
attempted to bring the box to the parent. 
Results 
 Once again, the primary investigation was whether children would display 
different patterns of exploratory behavior after hearing a harm-consequence explanation 
than a mechanical-consequence explanation. The descriptive data of number of children 
who performed each behavior are included in Table 3.2. An ordinal regression showed 
that there were no differences in proportion of children who displayed each of the 
behaviors shown in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.2. Descriptive data for number of children displaying each type of behavior in 
Experiment 2.
 Opened Box = No; 
Touched Toys = 
No 
Opened Box = Yes; 
Touched Toys = 
No 
Opened Box = Yes; 
Touched Toys = 
Yes 
Harm-Consequence 11 1 4 
Mechanical-
Consequence 
10 2 4 
Harm-Content 
Control 
6 0 10 
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 To investigate the effect of condition on children’s delay time, I once again ran 
a MANCOVA using condition type, age group, and gender, and all interaction effects 
as the predictors, and delay time for the two exploratory behaviors (delay time prior to 
opening the box, duration of time touching the toys inside) as the response. There was 
once again a significant effect of condition, F(4,72) = 3.53, p < .05, confirming that 
overall, children displayed different patterns of behavior across conditions. It was 
predicted that harm-consequence explanations would elicit the least exploratory play, 
followed by mechanical-consequence, and then harm-content control explanations. I 
thus tested directly for a linear trend8: Confirming this hypothesis, there was a 
significant linear trend for duration of time spent exploring the box, Linear Contrast 
Estimate = 25.85, SE = 7.08, p < .01. The result of this analysis is shown in Figure 3.3 
below. There was no linear trend for delay time prior to opening the box, p > .05. 
 
                                                
8 It is worth noting that the a priori hypothesis was one of directionality, not linearity, per se. Data were 
also tested for, but did not fit, a quadratic trend. 
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Figure 3.3. Estimated marginal means (bars represent standard errors) for duration of 
time spent exploring the toys inside the box across conditions in Experiment 2.  
 
 The results of Experiment 2 show that children who heard a harm-consequence 
explanation delayed exploration longer and explored less than those who heard an 
explanation merely relaying harm content merely relaying the same familiar word 
“cry”. The mechanical-consequence explanation fell in between the two conditions, 
suggesting that causal explanations elicit some inhibition of exploration, but not as 
much as harm-consequence causal explanations. These data suggest that in choosing 
to comply with or reject adult requests, children are motivated by the causal 
consequences of their potential future actions. Moreover, these results show that 2-
year-old children are affected by such causal consequences even when they are unable 
to reference their parents. 
General Discussion 
 Across two studies, children inhibited their exploratory behaviors in favor of 
following a rule specifically when that rule evoked harmful social consequences 
towards others. In Experiment 1, children explored less (and followed rules more) 
when their exploration evoked harmful consequences towards people than towards 
objects. In Experiment 2, children explored less when the target exploratory object 
evoked harmful consequences than when the object was merely associated with harm. 
These results suggest that young children’s exploratory behaviors are guided in part by 
their causal reasoning and by the prosocial consequences of their behaviors. 
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 Interestingly, children displayed lesser exploratory behavior, but delayed 
exploration for just as long across all conditions. This suggests that even young 
children may be predisposed to follow adult rules and regulations. However, once 
rules are broken (i.e., the box is opened), children continue to monitor and self-
regulate their exploratory play when such play may result in potential harm-based 
consequences. 
 These findings are congruent with findings suggesting that by the second year 
of life, children display empathetic, cooperative, and prosocial tendencies towards 
others (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2012; Svetlova et al., 2010; Warneken & Tomasello, 
2006; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992), as well as self-control and rule-internalization 
(Kochanska, 2002). The results show that such prosocial tendencies are directly linked 
to children’s self-control.  
 Importantly, these experiments find that self-control, at least in the context of 
exploratory play, is powerfully influenced by the social information that children 
receive (see Kidd, Palmeri, & Aslin, 2013 for a similar demonstration). This social 
information plays a role even when controlling for standard age differences (Mischel 
& Ebbesen, 1972), suggesting that social context may serve as an influence in 
children’s emerging ability to exercise self-control. 
 It is important to further investigate the mechanisms by which children learn to 
delay in response to causal explanations that reference harm. Harm-consequence 
explanations may draw on a combination of children’s empathic and prosocial 
tendencies and their causal understanding, both of which develop during the same 
developmental period targeted in this study. Importantly, as found in Experiment 2, 
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prosociality is neither elicited solely by mention of harm nor by parental 
encouragement to self-control. Instead, there are at least two reasons to believe that 
children engaged in genuine causal reasoning in this task. First, in Experiment 2, 
children relied on their understanding of the causal link between another children’s 
crying and their own behaviors towards the box, and not simply on their familiarity 
with harm or with the word “cry”. Second, in Experiment 2, when parents were not 
watching, children inhibited exploration after being given a causal explanation 
invoking mechanical consequences. This study points to the importance of studying 
the interaction between emotional and cognitive components of rule-following 
behavior. Future work may further explore this interaction. 
 These studies join recent work suggesting that children make important trade-
offs during development, and especially during their exploratory play (Bonawitz et al., 
2011). Moreover, children appear to use their prosocial tendencies and causal 
understandings when making choices between rule-following and rule-breaking 
behavior. This work hints at broader implications for parenting, and future work may 
explore how parents may elicit children’s rule-following behavior through appealing 
to young children’s prosocial and causal understanding. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
GIVING PRESCHOOLERS CHOICE INCREASES SHARING BEHAVIOR 
Introduction 
 People very rapidly acquire remarkable prosocial tendencies. By the second to 
third year of life, children help others complete their goals (Warneken & Tomasello, 
2006), share toys (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2008; Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 
2010), sympathize with those who are harmed (Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009) 
or are in distress (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, & Wagner, 1992), and punish those 
who harm others (Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010; 
Vaish, Missana, & Tomasello, 2011). How children acquire such tendencies remains 
an understudied question in present empirical research. Here, I explore the possibility 
that the ability to make choices encourages young children’s prosocial behavior. 
 One potential mechanism for the expression of prosocial behavior is through 
past experience with prosocial action (e.g., Staub, 1971). Work on self-perception 
theory and the foot-in-the-door effect (see Beaman, Cole, Preston, Klenty, & Steblay, 
1983; Bem, 1967; Eisenberg, Cialdini, McCreath, & Shell, 1987; Lepper, 1973) 
suggests that individuals are likely to act in congruence with their past actions because 
of a desire to stay self-consistent. Thus, through acting prosocially, children may be 
forming a cognitive representation of what “the self” is like, and acting in accordance 
with that representation (Freedman & Fraser, 1966; Grusec, Kuczynski, Rushton, & 
Simutis 1978; Grusec & Redler, 1980).  
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 Importantly, children evaluate their actions not simply by their occurrence, but 
also by the contexts under which they occur. In an important study by Warneken and 
Tomasello (2008), toddlers were given material rewards, social praise, or no rewards 
at all after performing the target prosocial action of helping an adult obtain an out-of-
reach object. Although most children initially helped, only those children who were 
given no reward at all, or who were given social praise, continued to help the adult at 
subsequent time points (in the absence of rewards). Children thus used reward as an 
indicator of how desirable their actions were: children who were materially rewarded 
inferred that they performed the prosocial behavior solely in order to obtain the 
reward, whereas those who were not materially rewarded inferred that they performed 
the prosocial behavior for its own intrinsic purpose (Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973).  
 This study explores another important context: choice. Choice, I argue, 
involves a contrast between a performed action (e.g., sharing a toy) and an alternative 
action not performed (e.g., not sharing the toy). For example, we evaluate Bob, who 
voluntarily gave his last $5 to charity but could have kept it for himself (had an 
alternative) more positively than Jim, who accidentally dropped his last $5 into the 
hands of a homeless person. In this example, Bob presumably, had an alternative in 
which he could have kept his $5 for himself. Jim, on the other hand, had no 
alternative. We also go beyond evaluating choice in absolute terms (having vs. not 
having choice) and consider the costliness of our chosen actions.  To extend the above 
example, we would consider Bob more generous if his choice was to give away his 
last $5 than if his choice was to give away $5 out of his $100.  Thus, both the presence 
and the costliness of choice influence how we evaluate others. 
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 No study to my knowledge has addressed whether choice plays a causal role in 
young children’s prosocial behavior. There is some evidence that by middle 
childhood, children benefit from having choices in prosocial contexts (Grusec et al., 
1978; McGrath, Wilson, & Frasetto, 1995; McGrath & Power, 1990). There are also 
correlations between the maturity of young children’s moral reasoning and their ability 
to make costly prosocial choices (Eisenberg & Shell, 1986). This finding indicates a 
potential causal link between costly choices and subsequent moral behavior.  Here I 
ask whether making personally costly choices increases young children’s prosociality.  
Specifically, I hypothesized that the contrast between actions chosen and alternative 
actions not chosen influences children’s behavior above and beyond the prosociality of 
the actions themselves.  
 Across two studies, I allowed preschool-aged children (3-4 year-olds) to 
perform a prosocial action: allocating a limited and desired resource to a puppet that 
was feeling sad. I systematically manipulated the presence and magnitude of 
alternative actions. In some cases, the alternative action (keeping the resource for 
themselves) created a choice that was particularly appealing (i.e., costly). In other 
cases the alternative action (throwing the resource away) created a choice that was 
neutral (i.e., non-costly). Finally, in other cases there was no alternative (i.e., no 
choice), and children were instructed to allocate the resource. I was interested in how 
the presence of these alternative actions affected children’s subsequent prosociality. 
Subsequent prosociality was measured by allowing children to engage in a new 
prosocial action towards a different puppet.  
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Experiment 1 
 In Experiment 1, children were presented with an attractive, and limited 
resource: 1 star sticker that they could give to a puppet (“Doggie”) who was described 
as feeling sad. I manipulated children’s experience of choice by allowing children to 
either make a Costly Choice (give the sticker to Doggie instead of keeping it for 
themselves), Non-Costly Choice (give the sticker to Doggie instead of having the 
experimenter put the sticker away), or No Choice (instructed to give the sticker to 
Doggie). Children’s actions towards Doggie were recorded. I then measured 
subsequent prosociality: all children were introduced to a new puppet (“Ellie”) who 
was also feeling sad, and given three smiley face stickers that they could either keep 
for themselves or share with Ellie.  
Method 
Participants 
 Seventy-two preschool-aged children (mean: 3.96 years; range: 2.85–4.98) 
participated. Conditions were fully balanced for age and gender. One child was 
replaced due to parental interference. Participants were recruited from a local school 
or children’s museum in a small university town. Demographics data was not collected 
but most participants were of European-American background. 
Materials 
 Materials were two plush puppets (“Doggie” and “Ellie”); three wooden boxes: 
Doggie’s box, Ellie’s box (both of which had pictures on the tops and insides of 
Doggie and Ellie, respectively), and the child’s box (no pictures); and a set of star and 
smiley face stickers. A schematic of materials and procedure is shown in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 Schematic of experiment procedure and materials used.  
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Procedure 
 Introduction. Children were shown a plush animal named “Doggie” and told 
that Doggie was feeling “very sad today”. Doggie was then put away. A toy box was 
placed on the table and introduced as “Doggie’s box.”  
 Choice Manipulation. All children were induced to act prosocially. However, I 
varied the alternative option across conditions. All conditions were presented between-
subjects. In the Costly Choice Condition, children were presented with the choice of 
either keeping the sticker for themselves or giving it to Doggie. In the Non-Costly 
Choice condition, children were presented with the choice of putting the sticker away 
or giving it to Doggie. Finally, in the No Choice Condition, the same two alternatives 
were presented as in the Costly Choice condition (“I’m going to tell you whether you 
get to keep this sticker for yourself or you have to put it in the box for Doggie so that 
he feels better”), but children’s actions were restricted by experimenter instruction 
(“This star sticker, you have to put in the box for Doggie so that he feels better”). 
Across all conditions, once children made their final choices, the experimenter said 
“good job!” and put the toy box away. 
 Dependent Measure. A new puppet was then shown (“Ellie”), and children 
were told that Ellie was also feeling sad. Ellie was then put away, Ellie’s box was 
presented along with a second (plain) box on the table, and three smiley-faced stickers 
placed between the two boxes. The positioning of the two boxes was counterbalanced 
across participants. The experimenter then said that the three smiley-face stickers were 
for the child, but that Ellie also really liked them.  The number three was chosen to 
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force children to create an uneven distribution; that is, children were forced to either to 
prioritize themselves, or to prioritize Ellie when distributing stickers.  
 After counting the stickers, the experimenter then said that the child could 
either keep all of the stickers for him/herself and put them in the plain box, or share 
some with Ellie and put some in Ellie’s box. The experimenter reminded the child 
whose box was whose, by relabeling the boxes and stating to the child that they could 
put some stickers in either one. Re-prompts were used if children left any stickers on 
the table (“and what do you want to do with this/that one?”), until a box was chosen 
for each sticker. 
Coding 
 All children were videotaped, with the exception of 5 children whose parents 
did not provide video consent and whose actions were instead transcribed by an 
assistant. The first author and a condition-blind research assistant coded all videos for 
the number of stickers given to Ellie. Inter-rater reliability was 100%. 
Results and Discussion 
 Preliminary analyses revealed no effects of age or gender for any of the 
experiments, so data were collapsed across these variables. All reported tests are two-
tailed. I first analyzed children’s initial prosocial responses: the overwhelming 
majority of children chose the prosocial action over the non-prosocial alternative: 
19/24 in the Costly Choice condition, 23/24 in the Non-Costly Choice condition, and 
23/24 in the No Choice condition. Binomial tests confirmed that the number of 
children who performed the prosocial action was significantly above chance in each 
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condition, Binomial p’s < .01. Therefore, children were initially motivated to share 
regardless of condition. 
 Next, I analyzed children’s prosocial actions subsequent to the choice 
manipulation. Because comparisons across conditions relied critically on children 
having performed the same initial prosocial action, I looked at data for the children 
who performed the initial action. 
 The majority (75%) of children gave at least one sticker to Ellie and kept at 
least one for themselves, suggesting that children were both motivated to keep stickers 
and also to share (see Table 4.1 for distributions of stickers given across conditions). 
Children were divided into two response groups based on whether they distributed 
unequally in favor of themselves or Ellie: other-prioritizing (children who gave the 
majority of stickers to Ellie) and self-prioritizing (children who gave the minority of 
stickers to Ellie). A higher proportion of children in the Costly Choice condition made 
an other-prioritizing response than those in the No Choice condition, Fisher’s exact 
test p < .05 (see Figure 4.2), suggesting that having choice influenced children’s 
subsequent sharing.9 The cost of the choice also affected sharing: a higher proportion 
of children who made the initial Costly Choice were other-prioritizing than those who 
made the Non-Costly choice, Fisher’s p < .05. 
 The results of Experiment 1 thus provide initial evidence that having made a 
costly choice to perform a prosocial action (sharing) increased children’s later 
prosocial behaviors. It remains unclear, however, whether making a costly choice for 
prosocial reasons, rather than simply a costly choice, affected children’s prosocial 
                                                
9 P-values are corrected for multiple comparisons using a sequential Bonferonni correction. 
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behavior. In choosing to share the sticker, children’s responses may have been 
affected simply by having made the costly choice of inhibiting their own desire to take 
the sticker. Experiment 1b sought to resolve this question by asking children to make a 
costly choice (desire inhibition) in a non-prosocial context. 
 
Table 4.1. Number of children who made each sticker allocation type (0, 1, 2, or 3 
stickers) towards Ellie across conditions. Modal responses for each condition are 
underlined. 
 
 
 
 
Number 
of 
children 
making 
each 
allocation 
type 
towards 
Ellie 
 Exp 1: 
Costly 
Choice 
Exp 1: 
Non-
Costly 
Choice 
Exp 1: 
No 
Choice 
Exp 1b: 
Non-
Prosocial 
Costly 
Choice 
Exp 2: 
Costly 
Choice 
Exp 2: 
Non-
Costly 
Choice 
0 stickers 1 3 2 1 2 3 
1 sticker 4 14 13 14 5 13 
2 stickers 10 3 4 4 11 5 
3 stickers 4 3 4 4 3 3 
 
Experiment 1b: Non-Prosocial Costly Choice Condition 
 The procedure largely followed that of Experiment 1. However, instead of 
being introduced to Doggie, children were simply shown a star sticker and asked to 
make a choice to either to play with the sticker now or forego playing with it now but 
get to keep the sticker later. After making the choice, children were shown the new 
puppet, Ellie, and the rest of experimental procedure followed that of Experiment 1.  
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Figure 4.2. Results for all experiments (*, p < .05, **, p < .01). 
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Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-four preschool-aged children (mean: 3.88 years; range: 2.87– 4.98) 
participated. Once again, I fully balanced age and gender. Participants were recruited 
from a local school or children’s museum in a university town. Demographics data 
were not collected but participants were of predominantly European-American 
background. One child was replaced because she did not understand English. 
Materials 
 Materials were identical to those in Experiment 1, but the first puppet (Doggie) 
was not used. 
Procedure 
 The procedure largely followed that of Experiment 1, with the following 
modifications: Instead of being introduced to Doggie, children were simply shown a 
star sticker and then shown a plain wooden box (“I have this star sticker here, and I 
have this box”). Children were then given a choice to either play with the sticker now 
or place it in the plain wooden box to keep and take home later (“You get to choose – 
you can either just play with the sticker now, or you can put it in the box and get to 
keep it for later”) The dependent measures and new puppet (“Ellie”) was the same as 
in Experiment 1. 
Coding 
 Coding procedures followed those outlined in Experiment 1. Once again, all 
children were videotaped, with the exception of 2 children whose parents did not 
provide video consent. Inter-rater reliability was 100%. 
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Results and Discussion 
 Almost all of children (23/24) chose the initial target action of placing the 
sticker in the box, and inhibiting their immediate desire in order to keep the sticker. 
Binomial tests confirmed that this proportion was significantly above chance, p < 
.001. A significantly smaller proportion of children in Experiment 1b made the other-
prioritizing choice than children in the Costly Choice condition of Experiment 1, 
Fisher’s p < .05, suggesting that children’s sharing behaviors were impacted by initial 
practice with costly choices in a prosocial context, and not just by the cost of not 
getting to have the stickers immediately.  
 The results thus far suggest that making a prosocial choice at a cost to oneself 
causes children to continue to be prosocial when faced with a new choice. Why might 
this be the case? One candidate possibility is that, by observing their costly choices, 
children inferred their own prosociality. 
 The above explanation is consistent with traditional self-perception theories 
(Bem 1967; 1972), which predict that people learn about their own preferences by 
observing their own actions as though they were third-party spectators. There are, 
however, at least two alternative explanations. One possible explanation is that the 
initial costly choice led children to believe that they had exhibited their dislike for the 
object (e.g. “I shared the sticker so I must not like stickers”). Another possibility is 
that the initial Costly Choice caused children to simply repeat the initial outcome of 
distributing more to another than to themselves, either as a result of being “primed” 
with the concept of giving more to others, or due to a desire to stay self-consistent in 
front of the experimenter (see Eisenberg et al., 1987). 
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Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 was designed to rule out these possibilities. Procedures mirrored 
those of Experiment 1’s Costly Choice condition, with the following modifications. 
Children were once again introduced to the first puppet, Doggie. This time, however, 
in the Costly Choice condition, children were given a colorful rubber toy frog, rather 
than a star sticker. In the Non-Costly Choice condition, children were given a small 
white piece of torn paper. All children were told they could choose to either keep the 
object for themselves or give it to Doggie. The dependent measure (and the new 
puppet, Ellie) remained the same. 
 It is important to note that unlike in Experiment 1, the objects used were 
different between the choice manipulation (which involved either a frog or piece of 
paper) and the dependent measure (which again involved smiley face stickers). Thus, 
any increased tendencies to share stickers during the dependent measure phase could 
not be attributed to children’s inferences about their preference (or lack thereof) for 
stickers. Additionally, the choice manipulation of both the Costly and Non-Costly 
Choice conditions of Experiment 2 required children to undertake the same prosocial 
action of giving an object to Doggie, controlling for the possibility that initial practice 
with giving objects causes children to simply repeat the outcome of giving more to 
others than to themselves. 
Method 
Participants 
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 Forty-eight preschool-aged children (mean: 3.91 years; range: 2.81–4.96) 
participated. I fully balanced age and gender. Participants were recruited from a local 
school or children’s museum in a small university town. Demographics were not 
collected but the majority of participants were of European-American background. 
Four children were replaced: 3 due to protocol error (the experimenter did not 
correctly present the puppets or the boxes), and 1 due to prior participation. 
Materials 
 Materials were identical to those used in Experiment 1, except a set of colorful 
toy frogs and plain torn pieces of paper (about 1”) were used during the introduction 
instead of star stickers. 
Procedure 
 The procedure largely followed that of Experiment 1, with the following 
modifications: In the Costly Choice Condition, children were given an attractive 
object (a colorful toy frog), instead of a star sticker. All children were then told they 
could either keep it or give it with Doggie. In the Non-Costly Choice condition, 
children were given a small torn piece of paper and told they could either keep it or 
give it to Doggie. The dependent measures and the new puppet (“Ellie”) was the same 
as in Experiments 1 and 1b. 
Rating Study 
 In order to make sure that I was justified in the assumption that they toy frog 
would be a more costly choice than the piece of paper for children, an additional 
sample of 20 children (Mean age: 3.87 years, range: 2.84–4.84; 11 female) was shown 
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the torn paper, and the toy frog, and asked to point to the one they liked more. The 
positioning of the two objects was counterbalanced. 
Coding 
 Coding procedures followed that of Experiment 1. Inter-rater reliability was 
98%. 
Results and Discussion 
 An independent sample of 19/20 children confirmed that they preferred the 
frog to the paper. These data justify the assumption that giving away the toy frog was 
a more costly choice than giving away the piece of paper. Once again, almost all of 
children in both the Costly Choice (frog) condition (21/24) and all of the children in 
the Non-Costly Choice (paper) condition (24/24) chose the prosocial option (giving 
the object to Doggie) over the non-prosocial alternative. Binomial tests confirmed that 
the proportion of children who performed the prosocial action was significantly above 
chance, p’s < .001.  
 Of those who were initially prosocial, a higher proportion of children in the 
Costly Choice (frog) condition performed other-prioritizing prosocial behaviors than 
those in the Non-Costly Choice (paper) condition, Fisher’s p < .05, demonstrating 
once again, that costly choices led to greater subsequent sharing behaviors.  
 Moreover, these data confirm that children’s prosociality in Experiment 1 
could not be explained by children having made inferences about their own lack of 
preference for stickers: children in the Costly Choice condition of Experiment 2 
shared at nearly the exact same rate as those in the Costly Choice condition of 
Experiment 1 (74% made the other-prioritizing choice in Experiment 1 vs. 66% in 
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Experiment 2; Fisher’s exact test p > .15). Similarly, this experiment rules out the 
possibility that children in Experiment 1 simply repeated the outcome of giving 
objects away; Children in both conditions of Experiment 2 initially gave an object 
away (and thus had fewer objects than Doggie), but children nonetheless shared at 
different rates across the two conditions. 
General Discussion 
 I began this paper with the hypothesis that allowing children opportunities to 
make costly prosocial choices plays an important role in their subsequent prosocial 
behavior. In fact, children were more prosocial after making costly choices 
(Experiments 1) than non-costly choices, after making choices in a prosocial context 
than in a non-prosocial context (Experiment 1b), and after sharing valuable than non-
valuable objects (Experiment 2). Together, the results strongly support the idea that 
even very limited experience making costly choices affects young children’s 
prosociality. 
 These findings are consistent with self-perception theory (see Cialdini, 
Eisenberg, Shell, & McCreath, 1987; Grusec et al., 1978): in making costly prosocial 
choices, children construe their actions as a signal of their prosociality (e.g., “I shared 
so I must like to share”). The results are also consistent with prior developmental 
findings that children show longitudinal consistency in the display of high-cost 
sharing behaviors (Eisenberg et al., 1987; 1999; 2002), and that high-cost prosocial 
behaviors are systematically correlated with mature moral judgment (Eisenberg & 
Shell, 1986). I propose that prosocial construals may also motivate early prosocial 
behavior. This prosocial construal hypothesis suggests that even before children make 
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sophisticated prosocial trait inferences about themselves, they evaluate their actions in 
the context of non-chosen alternatives. Such evaluations may be one mechanism by 
which later self-perceptions emerge. 
 The pattern of results found is particularly notable when considering the 
competing influences that could have affected children’s subsequent prosocial 
behaviors towards the new puppet. First, making costly choices could have cognitively 
depleted children and caused them to be less likely to perform the prosocial behavior 
later on (see Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). On a physiological level, children could 
have been taxed by the initial behavior of giving up an otherwise desired object to the 
first puppet, and on a cognitive level, children could have felt that they were already 
prosocial once, and thus did not need to “prove themselves” again (see work on moral 
self-licensing theory; Merritt, Effron, & Bonin, 2010). This experiment found, 
however, that this was not the case. Second, children overcame a potential novelty 
bias: following the costly choice condition of Experiment 2, the majority of children 
gave most of their stickers to Ellie, despite the fact that stickers were now a novel (and 
therefore, particularly appealing) object. Children were not simply motivated to do 
what an adult authority asked them to do: following experimenter instruction in the No 
Choice condition could have set an implicit social norm (Rakoczy, Warneken, & 
Tomasello, 2008), or an implication that being prosocial was the “rule”. Children in 
this condition, however, were less prosocial than those in the Costly Choice 
conditions, in which no potential rule was relayed.  Together, these show that 
children’s initial practice with costly choices was a particularly salient manipulation, 
even when competing against other potential biases. 
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 Further work may examine the specific features of costly choice situations that 
enable children’s subsequent prosocial behavior. Children may have been affected 
specifically by the emotional valence of the cost. If this is the case, we might expect 
children to have experienced greater emotional arousal in performing costly actions. It 
is also possible that children were subconsciously attuned to their own pride in making 
a choice that was costly, and were thus motivated to make themselves proud again by 
being prosocial. Yet another possibility is that in making a costly prosocial choice, 
children actively self-regulated their own physiological arousal elicited by hearing 
about a sad puppet (Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2012). The coordination of setting 
goals and watching oneself effectively self-regulate in order to meet those goals may 
then have empowered children to repeat the self-regulatory prosocial behavior later on 
(Grolnick, 2009). All of these possibilities may inform how children encode and 
remember costly vs. non-costly choice situations. 
 The specific nature of the learning process that may occur during costly choice 
situations is also another important question. It is important to note that prior work has 
found that children do not show the concept of trait stability until middle childhood 
(e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1987; Grusec, & Redler, 1980). I therefore posit that it is 
unlikely that the young children who made costly choices in this study inferred that 
they had stable dispositional traits (e.g., “I shared so I must be the type of person who 
shares). Rather, children may have made a more subtle inference. Children, instead, 
may have learning about their own abilities to be prosocial, their own preference to 
help others, or their own intentions. 
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 These results also have underlying implications for children’s moral 
development (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1999). It is important for future work to determine 
the scope of influence that costly choices have on the development of prosocial 
behavior. Moral self-construction is likely to be the product of a rather complicated 
process involving emotional, behavioral, and cognitive components (Blasi, 1983; 
Hardy & Carlo, 2011; Kochanska, 2002). These findings show that costly choices play 
a causal role in determining the short-term prosocial behavior of very young children. 
Though more research is needed to investigate how choice interacts with other 
components of moral development, demonstrating the short-term results underscores 
previous findings that choice may make a critical contribution to children’s emerging 
understanding of themselves as moral beings.
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CONCLUSION  
 To return to the idea with which this dissertation began, humans are rapid 
learners, and within a short developmental timeframe accomplish the rather daunting 
task of constructing their moral and social worlds. To make sense of the endless array 
of moral, social, and evaluative information that children are bombarded with, there 
must be a framework that supports children’s ability to form moral judgments, to 
construct their ideas about what morality is and isn’t, and to translate those ideas into 
their prosocial behavior.   
 The synthesis of these chapters, as well as my own follow-up work, suggests 
an intriguing possibility, that I hope will serve as a foundation for further inquiry. I 
propose that choice – both the understanding of it, and the experience of it – is used as 
a rational framework by which children are able to make moral inferences. In this 
Chapter, I will review this framework and its associated predictions, how the 
framework's predictions are or aren’t supported by the empirical data presented, and 
ideas for ongoing work and future directions. 
Choice as a Framework for Rational Inference 
 To begin, I return to the ideas reiterated in these chapters: that ideas about 
choice and morality are inherently linked (Nichols & Knobe, 2006; Pizarro & Helzer, 
2010; Phillips & Knobe, 2009; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). The empirical investigations 
suggest that this link occurs early in development, and importantly that choice is a 
strong elicitor of children’s moral judgments and prosocial behaviors. In using choice 
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as a framework through which children filter moral information, I propose that 
children compare observed actions (e.g., Bob shared with Mary) with possible 
alternative actions (e.g., Bob could have kept all the toys for himself) in order to make 
inferences about moral blame or praise (e.g., Bob likes sharing, so we should reward 
Bob). In the studies presented in Chapter 4, children learned about their own sharing 
intentions and abilities through performing actions (sharing) with alternative 
possibilities (e.g., not sharing). 
 Importantly, this framework is both qualitative and computational. On the 
qualitative side, children appear to evaluate not only the presence of alternative 
actions, but also the quality of alternative actions that were available (e.g., “Was the 
alternative a reasonable one?”). Alternative actions thus provide a context through 
which to judge the performed action (“Was my action of giving the sticker to the 
puppy particularly nice if my alternative was to throw it away?”). In support of this 
view, when alternatives are not appealing or reasonable (e.g. when children donated a 
sticker, but could alternatively throw it away), children did not appear to form a self-
relevant inference about their own prosociality. 
 On the computational side, the presence of alternatives makes the chosen 
action (e.g., sharing) statistically less likely to have occurred. Young children make 
intuitive assumptions about the likelihood of actions (e.g., “How likely is was my 
observed action of choosing a red ball from the box, if the box contained 50% red 
balls?”; see Xu & Garcia, 2008; Xu & Kushnir, 2013). In an influential study, Kushnir 
and colleagues (Kushnir, Xu, & Wellman, 2010) found that when children observed 
actions that were statistically unlikely (e.g., Bob pulling out a red ball out of a box 
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with only 10% red balls), they made inferences about psychological causes (e.g., Bob 
must have really liked the red ball). 
 In the moral domain, children may therefore be forming intuitions about the 
likehood of their own sharing behavior. Specifically, the occurred action is less likely 
when it is chosen (e.g., “It is unlikely I would have shared if I could have kept this 
sticker for myself”) than when it is not (“It is likely I would have shared if I was 
instructed to do so”). In the first case, children are thus forced to ascribe a cause for 
the observed behavior (“Why would I have shared if it was unlikely?”), and the cause 
is generally a self-relevant inference (“It must be because I like sharing”). 
 This theory makes several important predictions. First, it suggests that the 
more unlikely an event becomes, the more likely children should be to ascribe its 
occurrence to an unseen cause. That is, it is somewhat unlikely that Bob would donate 
$20 to charity if he has only $100 in his bank account, even more unlikely if he has 
$50, and very unlikely if he has only $20. The more Bob’s action of donating to 
charity violates our predictions of what he’ll do, the surer we should be that if Bob 
shared, it is because he really, really wanted to. In a follow-up study, I found that this 
was exactly how young children reasoned as well. In a study similar to that presented 
in Chapter 4, children were given the choice to give an attractive sticker to a puppet 
who was feeling sad. All of the children chose to give the sticker, but the critical 
manipulation was how generous the action was. One group of children donated the 
sticker while also being given 3 stickers to keep for themselves (and thus, effectively, 
donated only 1/4, or 25%, of their total stickers); another group donated the sticker 
while also being given 2 stickers (and thus donated 33% of their stickers); another 
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group was given 1 sticker to keep for themselves (and thus donated 50% stickers), and 
finally, the last group of children donated a sticker but was given no stickers to keep 
for themselves (and thus donated 100% of their stickers). 
 To assess whether children’s initial generosity had an impact on their 
subsequent behavior, I then measured children’s subsequent sharing. All children were 
then introduced to a new puppet and given 3 more stickers that they could split 
however they wished. I reasoned that children might use the strength of their initial 
generosity to infer their preference for sharing. If this is the case, they should be the 
most likely to share altruistically in this dependent measure phase in the 100% (1/1) 
condition, and the least likely in the 25% (1/4) condition. 
 This was exactly what happened, and the results are shown in Figure 5.1 
below: the more generous the original action, the more likely children were to share 
altruistically in the dependent measure phase. 
 As seen in the graph below, initial generosity predicted subsequent generosity 
in a linear fashion (Linear Contrast p < .01).10 This work is ongoing (Chernyak, Trieu, 
& Kushnir, in preparation) and supports the idea that children’s judgments of choice 
are made through intuitive computations of likelihood. 
 
 
 
                                                
10 Once again, directionality was predicted a priori, but not linearity, per se. Data, however, followed a 
linear, not a quadratic, trend.  
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Figure 5.1. Proportion of other-prioritizing responders in the dependent measure phase 
across conditions. 
 
 Thus far I have shown only how children’s subsequent behavior is affected by 
their initial experience of choice and alternative possibility. If children use the 
experience of choice and alternative possibility as a way of making inferences about 
themselves, children’s self-relevant cognitions should also change after making costly 
choices. Thus far, I have found some preliminary evidence that children reason 
differently about their own actions when those actions were costly than when they 
were not (Chernyak & Kushnir, 2013). However, this is an area that may be fruitful 
for future research. Further planned work may code for how children explain, 
remember, encode, and narrative their own costly chosen actions. Another question is 
whether costly giving situations allow children to form a more cohesive understanding 
of their self-identity. And finally, one of the most critical questions is how children’s 
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cognitions following costly choice situations subsequently translate into their 
behavioral responses (sharing). 
 Another important prediction is that the use of choice as a means of rational 
inferences is a domain-general way of reasoning about action and preference. In fact, 
work by Kushnir and colleagues, as well as my own ongoing work, suggests that 
children use this framework to infer their own toy preference (Chernyak, Gentilini, & 
Kushnir, in preparation), the toy preference of others (Kushnir et al., 2010), and the 
prosociality of others (Chernyak, Yang, & Kushnir, in preparation). Therefore, 
children use choice to understand action across domains and situations. Moreover, 
choice is used to understand one’s own actions and the observed actions of others.  
Cultural Construals of Choice 
 One important assumption of the choice as a means of rational inference 
account is that moral actions, in general, must be perceived as choices. That is, if we 
use choice to make moral evaluations about others, we must also generally believe that 
moral actions are choices. Interestingly, Chapter 2 would appear to challenge this view 
by showing that young children across cultures posit that moral actions are 
constraints. Further, children endorse the idea that people neither can nor do act on 
personal desires when those desires violate a social or moral obligation. At first 
glance, these data suggest that children use different frameworks for understanding 
moral actions than do adults (who, at least in our culture, generally endorse the idea 
that moral actions are freely chosen). I would argue instead that rather than pointing to 
stark differences between children and adults’ views of morality, the data suggest two 
intriguing conclusions:  
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 First, children’s understanding of moral actions as choices appears to be 
flexible – that is, subject to situational, cultural, and developmental variability. In 
support of this view, older American children did judge moral actions to be choices 
while younger children did not (Chapter 2), suggesting rapid age-related changes 
during early childhood. Second in my own follow-up work, I have found that 
children’s understanding of actions as choices is easily manipulated by situational 
context (Chernyak & Kushnir, in press). The preschool age may therefore serve as a 
critical period during which children form ideas about choice and morality. 
 Second, these data suggest that there are important cultural differences in how 
moral actions are viewed. Although ideas about freedom of choice are often stressed 
as universally critical to moral evaluation, these data suggest instead that culture 
defines different frameworks for how to judge moral actions. One possibility, and my 
own intuition on this matter, is that moral actions are viewed as choices across 
cultures, but that “choice” itself is defined differently across cultures. For example, 
Eastern cultures often stress the importance of autonomy, or the understanding that 
one may perform actions that are not chosen but that are nonetheless desirable (Bao & 
Lam, 2008). Consider, for example, being assigned to read your favorite book for a 
school project. To the American mindset, this action is not chosen, because the book 
was assigned (rather than selected by you). To the Eastern mindset, however, this 
action is nonetheless considered autonomous because the action reflects what one 
would have desired to do anyway (see also Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). It is possible that 
Eastern cultures redefine the domain of ‘choice’ to include actions that happen to be 
personally desirable. This account might make the prediction that actions that are 
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considered autonomous (i.e., personally desirable) are also ones that are considered 
particularly morally blameworthy or praiseworthy.  
 A second, related possibility is that choice in Western, but not Eastern, cultures 
is often defined as the ability to separate one’s personal desires from one’s obligations. 
For example, the statement “You can make the choice to help your friend” often 
implies the alternative possibility that one may desire and choose not to. Western 
cultures might therefore stress the separation between desires and obligations. In 
contrast, Eastern cultures may stress an integration between desires and obligations. 
Indeed, Eastern participants are more likely than their Western counterparts to judge 
that certain duties, such as helping one’s friend, are personally desirable (Miller & 
Bersoff, 1994). The Eastern participants in my own study may have reasoned that 
acting on moral obligations is more desirable than acting on personal preferences. In a 
similar vein, young children may also view moral actions as choices because such 
actions are personally desirable. If either of these possibilities is the case, cultures may 
agree on the fact that moral actions are choices, but disagree on the definition of 
choice. 
Transmissions of Choice 
 An important remaining question is how concepts of choice become 
constructed in the child’s mind. Chapter 3 cannot speak directly to this question; 
however, the data from Chapter 3 suggest that ideas about morality are transmitted 
from adults to children through explanation. Children were asked to follow an 
obligation (not open a fun toy box) by inhibiting a desire (to open the toy box). The 
experiment was thus set up in a way that automatically separated children’s personal 
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preferences from their obligation to the adult experimenter. Here, adults presented 
children with either rational reasons to inhibit personal desires (e.g., “other kids will 
be sad”) or irrational ones (e.g., “the box is orange”). This work showed that choosing 
to act on obligations (defined, in this case, as following the adult mandates) was 
elicited by rational explanations. Such rational explanations, which appeal to 
children’s moral and causal reasoning, may be a means through which children form 
ideas that adult-given mandates are important. 
 Interestingly and importantly, the explanation that elicited the least amount of 
exploratory play focused on the child as an agent capable of making a choice; children 
were told that their possible action (opening the box) had a causal consequence on the 
world. Such explanations may automatically elicit the implication that the child’s 
other possible action (not opening the box) would not make the children cry. Whether 
children simultaneously represent these two possibilities in their minds remains an 
intriguing question. The harm-consequence explanation (“If you open the box, other 
kids will cry”) may allow children to represent each possible action as a choice with 
causal consequences (i.e., “if I choose path A and open the box, other children will 
cry, and if I choose alternate path B, other children will not”). Conversely, the harm-
content control would not elicit representing actions as choices because each stated 
path was not presented in a manner that was causally sensical and was therefore 
impossible to represent (e.g., “it is unclear what will happen if I choose path A vs. B”). 
Children’s ability to inhibit their own desires in order to follow rules might be 
predicted by causal reasoning about the consequences of their actions. Therefore, 
concepts of choice may be subtly transmitted from adults to children through 
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explanations that allow children to represent their own multiple possible actions (i.e., 
choices). Future work may investigate whether this is the case. 
Other Accounts of Moral Development 
 As noted in the introduction of this dissertation, there are many accounts of 
moral development, and it is important to consider how the choice as rational 
inference account might challenge and be challenged by these other accounts. The 
framework proposed is largely agnostic as to whether ideas about choice are innately 
specified. However, it is important to note that even young infants have some 
intuitions about actions, intentions, and alternative possibilities (Gergely & Csibra, 
2003; Woodward, Sommerville, Gerson, Henderson, & Buresch, 2009)). Moral 
judgment may therefore stem from the understanding of others as rational, intentional 
agents. My own ongoing work suggests that at least by the preschool age, moral 
judgments and prosocial behavior might be selectively targeted towards those whom 
we believe to be goal-directed, agentive beings (Chernyak & Gary, under review). 
 These accounts are also agnostic with regard to views that suggest that 
morality is motivated by emotion and physiology. Emotional cues may serve as 
motivation for children to behave prosocially or to attend to morally-valent scenarios. 
Once children do so, however, cognitive factors such as an understanding of choice 
may allow children to make inferences about moral praise or blame. Another 
possibility, however, is that emotion disrupts children’s abilities to make sophisticated 
moral judgments. 
 Finally, an important challenge comes from a body of work in social 
psychology, which suggests that moral reasoning is not rational or inferential at all 
  
105 
(see Haidt, 2001). This body of work has documented the existence of “moral errors” 
(Sunstein, 2005). For example, adults’ moral judgments are affected by “irrational” 
processes such as mood (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006), personal motivation (Uhlmann, 
Pizarro, Tenenbaum, & Ditto, 2009), or even story presentation order (Schwitzgebel & 
Cushman, 2012). There is reason to believe, however, that moral knowledge is 
constructed rationally, but is easily disrupted by various non-rational processes.  
Conclusion 
 Philosophers, psychologists, modern neuroscientists, and even policy makers 
have already speculated about the impact of choice on our beliefs about moral 
punishment and praise, on societal growth, and on human understanding. The studies 
in this dissertation tap into the underlying processes of how choice and morality 
become linked together – through cultural learning (Chapter 2), through social 
transmission (Chapter 3), and prior experience with choice and action (Chapter 4). 
Each of these studies also adds to the growing body of work suggesting that children 
show a host of sophisticated moral cognitions and prosocial behaviors. In continuing 
to focus on how such ideas are transmitted to and embedded in the child’s mind, we 
may be able to one day solve the ages-old question of how moral learning occurs. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A: Full List of Questionnaire Items (American Version) 
 
Free Choice Items: 
 
(1) Peter draws a picture every day at home. He always uses a pen to make his 
picture. But today, he wants to do something different. Peter wants to make his 
picture with pencil. 
 
Choice Question: Can Peter make his picture with pencils today? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Peter will do today? 
 Make his picture with pen Make his picture with pencils 
 
(2) Susan eats breakfast every morning. She always drinks hot lemon water with 
her breakfast. But today, she wants to do something different. Susan wants to 
drink milk tea. 
 
Choice Question: Can Susan drink milk tea today? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Susan do today? 
 Drink hot lemon water   Drink milk tea 
 
(3) Mary wears shoes outside every day. She always wears her pink shoes. But 
today, she wants to do something different. Mary wants to wear her blue 
sandals. 
 
Choice Question: Can Mary wear her blue sandals? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Mary will do today? 
 Wear her pink shoes   Wear her blue sandals 
Physical Constraint Items: 
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(1) Bobby walks to the store every day. He always walks around the big brick 
wall. But today, he wants to do something different. Bobby wants to walk right 
through the big brick wall. 
 
Choice Question: Can Bobby walk right through the wall? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Bobby will do today? 
 Walk around the wall  Walk through the wall 
 
(2) Karen is little girl and she is still growing every year. She always grows a little 
bit every year. But this year, she wants to do something different. Karen wants 
to stop growing and never grow again. 
 
Choice Question: Can Karen stop growing this year? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Karen will do this year? 
 Karen will grow a little bit  Karen won’t grow at all 
 
 
(3) Bonnie jumps up and down on the playground every day. She always jumps 
and comes back down. But today, Bonnie wants to do something different. 
Bonnie wants to float in the air and never come back down. 
 
Choice Question: Can Bonnie float in the air and never come back 
down? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Bonnie will do today? 
 Jump up and come back down  Float in the air 
Mental Constraint Items: 
 
(1) Andrew draws pictures every day. He always draws a picture of a dog. But 
today, Andrew wants to do something different. Andrew wants draw a monkey 
even though he’s never seen one before. But, Andrew has never seen a monkey 
before. He doesn’t know what a monkey looks like. 
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Choice Question: Can Andrew draw a monkey even though he’s never 
seen one before? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Andrew will do today? 
 Draw something he’s seen before Draw a monkey 
 
(2) Sally rides her bicycle every day. Sally has no idea how to fix her bicycle. 
Sally always asks other people to help her fix things she doesn’t know how to 
fix. But today, Sally wants to do something different. Sally wants to fix her 
bicycle even though she doesn’t know how. 
 
Choice Question: Can Sally fix her bicycle even though she doesn’t 
know how? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  Which do you think Sally will do today? 
Ask someone to help her fix her bicycle Fix her bicycle all 
      by herself 
 
 
(3) Kyle and his friend live far away. Kyle always asks his friend what he ate for 
lunch that today. But today, Kyle wants to do something different. He wants to 
know what his friend ate for lunch without asking. 
 
Choice Question: Can Kyle know what his friend ate for lunch without 
asking? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Kyle will do today? 
Ask his friend what he ate for lunch     Know what he ate for  
      lunch without asking 
Social Convention Items: 
 
(1) Gary puts on his clothes every day before he goes outside. He always puts on a 
shirt and pants. But today, Gary wants to do something different. Gary wants 
to wear his sister’s dress today. 
 
Choice Question: Can Gary wear his sister’s dress? 
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  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Gary will do today? 
 Wear a shirt and pants  Wear his sister’s dress 
 
(2) David is a little boy. He always eats dinner with his family. But today, David 
wants to do something different. David wants to eat dinner alone. 
 
Choice Question: Can David eat dinner alone? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think David will do today? 
 Eat dinner with his family  Eat dinner alone 
 
 
(3) Annie has guests over to her house every day. She always greets her guests by 
saying “hello”. But today, Annie wants to do something different. Annie wants 
to say nothing when she sees her guests. 
 
Choice Question: Can Annie say nothing when her guests come? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Annie will do today? 
 Say “namaste” to her guests  Say nothing to her guests 
 
Artifact Convention Items: 
 
(1) Miranda eats dinner every day. She always uses a fork to eat her dinner. But 
today, Miranda wants to do something different. Miranda wants to eat dinner 
using her feet. 
 
Choice Question: Can Miranda eat dinner using her feet? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Miranda will do today? 
 Eat with a fork   Eat with her feet 
 
(2) Ross buys groceries every week. He always carriers his groceries in a bag. But 
today, Ross wants to do something different. David wants to carry his 
groceries in a fish net. 
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Choice Question: Can Ross carry his groceries in a fishnet? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Ross will do this week? 
 Carry his groceries in a bag Carry his groceries in a fishnet 
 
 
(3) It is raining in Ben’s town today. He always uses an umbrella when it rains. 
But today, Ben wants to do something different. Ben wants to use a bucket 
when it rains. 
 
Choice Question: Can Ben use a bucket when it rains? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Ben will do today? 
 Use an umbrella   Use a bucket   
    
Moral Convention Items: 
 
(1) Johnny sees his friends every day. He always plays with his friends nicely. But 
today, Johnny wants to do something different. Johnny wants to hit his friends. 
 
Choice Question: Can Johnny hit his friends today? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Johnny will do today? 
 Play nicely    Hit his friends 
 
(2) Pat sees his friend every day. Pat always tells his friend something nice. But 
today, Pat wants to do something different. Pat wants to say something that 
will make his friend cry. 
 
Choice Question: Can Pat say something that will make his friend cry? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Pat will do today? 
 Say something nice  Say something that will make his 
     friend cry 
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(3) Rory’s mom gives Rory some candies to split between her brother and herself. 
Rory always gives half the candy to her brother, and takes half of them for 
herself. But today, Rory wants to do something different. Rory wants to steal 
all of the candies for herself. 
 
Choice Question: Can Rory steal all of the candies for herself? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Rory will do today? 
   Split the candy with her brother  Steal all of the 
         candy for herself 
 
Unjustified Rule Items: 
 
(1) Dina’s mom tells her that she has to sit on the green chair during dinner. Dina 
always listens to her mom and sits in the green chair. But today, Dina wants to 
do something different. Dina wants to sit on the red chair 
 
Choice Question: Can Dina sit in the red chair? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Dina will do today? 
 Sit on the green chair   Sit on the red chair 
 
(2) Rina’s town says you have to wear the color blue. Rina always listens to the 
town rule and wears blue clothing. But today, Rina wants to do something 
different. Rina wants to wear yellow clothing. 
 
Choice Question: Can Rina wear yellow clothing? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Rina will do today? 
   Wear blue clothing   Wear yellow clothing 
 
(3) Louis’s father always tells him to play with his blocks. Louis always listens to 
his father and plays with his blocks. But today, Louis wants to do something 
different. Louis wants to play with his ball and paddle.  
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Choice Question: Can Louis play with his ball and paddle? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Louis will do today? 
   Play with his blocks  Play with his ball and paddle 
 
Justified Rule Items: 
 
(1) Isaac’s parents don’t like him to play outside when it’s dark because it’s too 
dangerous and Isaac might get hurt. Isaac always stays indoors when it’s dark. 
But today, Isaac wants to do something different. Isaac wants to play outside in 
the dark. 
 
Choice Question: Can Isaac play outside in the dark? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Isaac will do tonight? 
 Stay indoors    Play outside 
 
(2) Noah’s town has a rule that says you’re not allowed to go outside without a hat 
because it’s cold and Noah might get sick. Noah always wears a hat outside. 
But today, Noah wants to do something different. Noah wants to go outside 
without a hat. 
 
Choice Question: Can Noah go outside without a hat? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Noah will do today? 
   Wear his hat    Go outside without a hat 
 
(3) Polly’s parents tell her not to lift her little sister because she’s too heavy for 
Polly and Polly might get hurt. Polly always listens to her parents and doesn’t 
lift her little sister. But today, Polly wants to do something different. Polly 
wants to lift her little sister. 
 
Choice Question: Can Polly lift her little sister? 
  Yes     No 
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Prediction Question:  What do you think Polly will do today? 
   Not lift her little sister   Lift her little sister 
 
Selfish Act Items: 
 
(1) Timmy eats lunch with his friends. Timmy always helps his friends clean the 
table after they are done eating. But today, Timmy wants to do something 
different. Timmy wants to go play outside and not help his friends clean the 
table. 
 
Choice Question: Can Timmy play outside instead of helping his 
 friends clean up? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Timmy will do after eating? 
 Clean up    Play outside 
 
(2) Jessica passes a bucket of free toys every day. Usually, Jessica takes some toys 
and shares them with her friends. But today, Jessica wants to do something 
different. Jessica wants to take all of the toys for herself. 
 
Choice Question: Can Jessica take all of the toys for herself? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Jessica will do with the toys? 
 Share them with her friends  Keep them for herself 
 
 
(3) Sarah helps her older sister every morning. Sarah cooks the breakfast while her 
older sister helps her younger brothers get ready for school. But today, Sarah 
wants to do something different. Sarah wants to sleep in and not help her sister 
cook breakfast.  
 
Choice Question: Can Sarah sleep in and not help her older sister cook 
 breakfast? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Sarah will do today? 
   Sleep in  Help her older sister cook breakfast 
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APPENDIX B: Full List of Questionnaire Items (Nepalese Version) 
Free Choice Items: 
 
(4) Kamal draws a picture every day at home. He always uses a pen to make his 
picture. But today, he wants to do something different. Kamal wants to make 
his picture with pencil. 
 
Choice Question: Can Kamal make his picture with pencils today? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Kamal will do today? 
 Make his picture with pen Make his picture with pencils 
 
(5) Rama eats breakfast every morning. She always drinks hot lemon water with 
her breakfast. But today, she wants to do something different. Rama wants to 
drink milk tea. 
 
Choice Question: Can Rama drink milk tea today? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Rama will do today? 
 Drink hot lemon water   Drink milk tea 
 
(6) Ramita wears shoes outside every day. She always wears her pink shoes. But 
today, she wants to do something different. Ramita wants to wear her blue 
sandals. 
 
Choice Question: Can Ramita wear her blue sandals? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Ramita will do today? 
 Wear her pink shoes   Wear her blue sandals 
Physical Constraint Items: 
 
(4) Ram walks to the store every day. He always walks around the big brick wall. 
But today, he wants to do something different. Ram wants to walk right 
through the big brick wall. 
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Choice Question: Can Ram walk right through the wall? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Ram will do today? 
 Walk around the wall  Walk through the wall 
 
(5) Radhika is little girl and she is still growing every year. She always grows a 
little bit every year. But this year, she wants to do something different. 
Radhika wants to stop growing and never grow again. 
 
Choice Question: Can Radhika stop growing this year? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Radhika will do this year? 
 Radhika will grow a little bit  Radhika won’t grow at all 
 
 
(6) Rita jumps up and down on the playground every day. She always jumps and 
comes back down. But today, Rita wants to do something different. Bonnie 
wants to float in the air and never come back down. 
 
Choice Question: Can Rita float in the air and never come back down? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Rita will do today? 
 Jump up and come back down  Float in the air 
Mental Constraint Items: 
 
(1) Shyam draws pictures every day. He always draws a picture of a dog. But 
today, Shyam wants to do something different. Shyam wants draw a monkey 
even though he’s never seen one before. But, Shyam has never seen a monkey 
before. He doesn’t know what a monkey looks like. 
 
Choice Question: Can Shyam draw a monkey even though he’s never 
seen one before? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Shyam will do today? 
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 Draw something he’s seen before Draw a monkey 
 
(2) Hari rides his bicycle every day. Hari has no idea how to fix his bicycle. Hari 
always asks other people to help him fix things she doesn’t know how to fix. 
But today, Hari wants to do something different. Hari wants to fix his bicycle 
even though she doesn’t know how. 
 
Choice Question: Can Hari fix his bicycle even though she doesn’t 
know how? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  Which do you think Hari will do today? 
Ask someone to help his fix her bicycle Fix his bicycle all 
      by himself 
 
 
(3) Jyothi and her friend live far away. Jyothi always asks her friend what she ate 
for lunch that today. But today, Jyothi wants to do something different. She 
wants to know what her friend ate for lunch without asking. 
 
Choice Question: Can Jyothi know what her friend ate for lunch 
without asking? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Jyothi will do today? 
Ask his friend what she ate for lunch     Know what she ate for 
      lunch without asking 
Social Convention Items: 
 
(4) Ravi puts on his clothes every day before he goes outside. He always puts on a 
shirt and pants. But today, Ravi wants to do something different. Ravi wants to 
wear his sister’s dress today. 
 
Choice Question: Can Ravi wear his sister’s dress? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Ravi will do today? 
 Wear a shirt and pants  Wear his sister’s dress 
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(5) Krishna is a little boy. He always eats dinner with his family. But today, 
Krishna wants to do something different. Krishna wants to eat dinner alone. 
 
Choice Question: Can Krishna eat dinner alone? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Krishna will do today? 
 Eat dinner with his family  Eat dinner alone 
 
 
(6) Rita has guests over to her house every day. She always greets her guests by 
saying “namaste”. But today, Rita wants to do something different. Rita wants 
to say nothing when she sees her guests. 
 
Choice Question: Can Rita say nothing when her guests come? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Rita will do today? 
 Say “namaste” to her guests  Say nothing to her guests 
 
Artifact Convention Items: 
 
(1) Rabindra eats dinner every day. She always uses her hands to eat her dinner. 
But today, Rabindra wants to do something different. Rabindra wants to eat 
dinner using her feet. 
 
Choice Question: Can Rabindra eat dinner using her feet? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Rabindra will do today? 
 Eat with her hands   Eat with her feet 
 
(2) Kavita buys groceries every week. She always carriers her groceries in a bag. 
But today, Kavita wants to do something different. Kavita wants to carry her 
groceries in a fish net. 
 
Choice Question: Can Kavita carry her groceries in a fishnet? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Kavita will do this week? 
  
121 
 Carry her groceries in a bag Carry her groceries in a fishnet 
 
 
(3) It is raining in Til Badhur’s village today. He always uses an umbrella when it 
rains. But today, Til Badhur wants to do something different. Til Badhur wants 
to use a bucket when it rains. 
 
Choice Question: Can Til Badhur use a bucket when it rains? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Til Badhur will do today? 
 Use an umbrella   Use a bucket   
    
Moral Convention Items: 
 
(1) Bishnu sees his friends every day. He always plays with his friends nicely. But 
today, Bishnu wants to do something different. Bishnu wants to hit his friends. 
 
Choice Question: Can Bishnu hit his friends today? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Bishnu will do today? 
 Play nicely    Hit his friends 
 
(2) Anita sees her friend every day. Anita always tells her friend something nice. 
But today, Anita wants to do something different. Anita wants to say 
something that will make her friend cry. 
 
Choice Question: Can Anita say something that will make her friend 
 cry? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Anita will do today? 
 Say something nice  Say something that will make her 
     friend cry 
 
 
(3) Purna’s mom gives Purna some candies to split between her brother and 
herself. Purna always gives half the candy to her brother, and takes half of 
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them for herself. But today, Purna wants to do something different. Purna 
wants to steal all of the candies for herself. 
 
Choice Question: Can Purna steal all of the candies for herself? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Purna will do today? 
   Split the candy with her brother  Steal all of the 
         candy for herself 
 
Unjustified Rule Items: 
 
(4) Kopila’s mom tells her that she has to sit in the straw mat during dinner. 
Kopila always listens to her mom and sits in the straw mat. But today, Kopila 
wants to do something different. Kopila wants to sit in the red chhakati 
(cushion). 
 
Choice Question: Can Kopila sit in the red chhakati? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Kopila will do today? 
 Sit on the straw mat   Sit on the red chhakati 
 
(5) Sita’s town says you have to wear the color blue. Sita always listens to the 
town rule and wears blue clothing. But today, Sita wants to do something 
different. Sita wants to wear yellow clothing. 
 
Choice Question: Can Sita wear yellow clothing? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Sita will do today? 
   Wear blue clothing   Wear yellow clothing 
 
(6) Raj’s father always tells him to play with his marbles. Raj always listens to his 
father and plays with his marbles. But today, Raj wants to do something 
different. Raj wants to play with a ball.  
 
Choice Question: Can Raj play with a ball? 
  Yes     No 
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Prediction Question:  What do you think Raj will do today? 
   Play with his marbles  Play with a ball 
 
Justified Rule Items: 
 
(4) Bikram’s parents don’t like him to play outside when it’s dark because it’s too 
dangerous and Bikram might get hurt. Bikram always stays indoors when it’s 
dark. But today, Bikram wants to do something different. Bikram wants to play 
outside in the dark. 
 
Choice Question: Can Bikram play outside in the dark? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Bikram will do tonight? 
 Stay indoors    Play outside 
 
(5) Sabina’s town has a rule that says you’re not allowed to go outside without a 
hat because it’s cold and Sabina might get sick. Sabina always wears a hat 
outside. But today, Sabina wants to do something different. Sabina wants to go 
outside without a hat. 
 
Choice Question: Can Sabina go outside without a hat? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Sabina will do today? 
   Wear her hat    Go outside without a hat 
 
(6) Samita’s parents tell her not to lift her little sister because she’s too heavy for 
Samita and Samita might get hurt. Samita always listens to her parents and 
doesn’t lift her little sister. But today, Samita wants to do something different. 
Samita wants to lift her little sister. 
 
Choice Question: Can Samita lift her little sister? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Samita will do today? 
   Not lift her little sister   Lift her little sister 
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Selfish Act Items: 
 
(4) Atma eats lunch with his friends. Atma always helps his friends clean the table 
after they are done eating. But today, Atma wants to do something different. 
Atma wants to go play outside and not help his friends clean the table. 
 
Choice Question: Can Atma play outside instead of helping his 
 friends clean up? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Atma will do after eating? 
 Clean up    Play outside 
 
(5) Sarita passes a bucket of free toys every day. Usually, Sarita takes some toys 
and shares them with her friends. But today, Sarita wants to do something 
different. Sarita wants to take all of the toys for herself. 
 
Choice Question: Can Sarita take all of the toys for herself? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Sarita will do with the toys? 
 Share them with her friends  Keep them for herself 
 
 
(6) Sadiksya helps her older sister every morning. Sadiksya cooks the breakfast 
while her older sister helps her younger brothers get ready for school. But 
today, Sadiksya wants to do something different. Sadiksya wants to sleep in 
and not help her sister cook breakfast.  
 
Choice Question: Can Sadiksya sleep in and not help her older sister 
 cook breakfast? 
  Yes     No 
 
Prediction Question:  What do you think Sadiksya will do today? 
   Sleep in  Help her older sister cook breakfast 
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APPENDIX C: Means (Standard Deviations in parentheses) of Free Choice Judgments 
Within Each Culture and Age Group 
 
 Nepal United States 
4 years 1 (0) .50 (0) 
5 years .33 (0) .07 (.10) 
6 years .40 (.19) .29 (.48) 
7 years .48 (.33) .54 (.39) 
8 years .37 (.27) .55 (.37) 
9 years .33 (.20) .83 (0) 
10 years .36 (.29) .67 (.58) 
11 years .43 (.28) 1.0 (0) 
 
 
APPENDIX D: Means (Standard Deviations in parentheses) of Action Predictions 
Within Each Culture and Age Group 
 
 Nepal United States 
4 years .33 (0) .33 (0) 
5 years .28 (.10) .03 (.07) 
6 years .19 (.25) .29 (.48) 
7 years .29 (.21) .34 (.32) 
8 years .33 (.24) .40 (.32) 
9 years .19 (.25) .66 (.24) 
10 years .32 (.25) .39 (.54) 
11 years .40 (.28) 1.0 (0) 
 
 
APPENDIX E: Binary Logistic Regression Results for the Free Choice Judgment for 
Each Socially Constrained Item 
 
 
 Culture B 
(SE(B)) 
Age B (SE(B)) Age X Culture B 
(SE(B)) 
Social Conventions .24 (2.34) .16 (.18) .11 (.29) 
Artifact Conventionsa -.09 (.18) -3.71 (2.48) .64 (.32)* 
Moral Conventionsa  -8.31 (2.87)** -.32 (.18) 1.09 (.37)** 
Unjustified Rules -.18 (.18) -4.56 (2.33)* .59 (.30) 
Justified Rulesa -6.10 (2.80)* -.27 (.19) .91 (.36)* 
Selfish Actsa  -9.14 (4.14)* .08 (.17) 1.28 (.57) 
 
Note: For culture, the Nepal group is used as the reference variable. 
* Significant predictors are marked by asterisks (*, p < .05; **, p < .01). 
a Superscript indicates that overall regression was significant at the p < .05 level.  
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APPENDIX F: Binary Logistic Regression Results for the Action Prediction Score for 
Each Socially Constrained Item 
 
 
 Culture B 
(SE(B)) 
Age B (SE(B)) Age X Culture B 
(SE(B)) 
Social Conventions 2.32 (2.65) .35 (.22) -.20 (.32) 
Artifact Conventionsa -2.40 (3.51) .21 (.28) .52 (.42) 
Moral Conventions  -3.06 (3.01) .15 (.21) .46 (.37) 
Unjustified Rules -3.43 (2.24) -.05 (.17) .42 (.29) 
Justified Rules -3.72 (2.98) -.21 (.24) .59 (.38) 
Selfish Acts  -3.42 (2.79) .08 (.18) .51 (.36) 
 
Note: For culture, the Nepal group is used as the reference variable. 
* Significant predictors are marked by asterisks (*, p < .05; **, p < .01). 
a Superscript indicates that overall regression was significant at the p < .05 level.  
